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“It is the unwarranted invasion of individual privacy which is reprehended,
1
and to be, so far as possible, prevented.”

INTRODUCTION
Imagine a community in which a police officer with no actual suspicion, but perhaps a curiosity, or even a vendetta, wants to spy on an
individual. Possibly this curiosity is a concern that the individual is
laundering money, accepting bribes by way of free home additions,
using the curtilage of his home as a meeting place for clandestine
groups, or using that space for some illegal activity such as storing stolen vehicles or growing illegal substances. Imagine further that the
police officer acts on this curiosity by hiring a high-powered satellite
with the capability of orbiting over the individual’s home every twenty-four hours and transmitting an image detailed enough to clearly
see items on the porch or curtilage as small as the size of a baseball
field’s home plate. Further, imagine that the people of this community are aware of this spying, but have no knowledge of when the police are doing so, and no mechanism through which they can object.
They may fence off their property to conceal the activities conducted
in their private curtilage. The police, however, have the ability to review images taken over several months and observe items stored,
changes to this area, evidence of secret outdoor meetings, or evidence of unlicensed home improvements, as well as the movement
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and identity of objects. The police can even drive up a public street
or private road with a high tech 360-degree camera mounted on the
roof of their vehicle and simultaneously record GPS measurements
and photograph individuals’ homes, vehicles parked in driveways,
items such as children’s toys on the porch, or anything visible from as
close as thirty feet away from the door.
While this may appear to describe the police surveillance system
of a military dictatorship or a futuristic Orwellian world, it, in fact,
describes our world today. Through satellite imaging technology
such as Google Earth (and its companion technologies of Google
Street View and Google Maps), law enforcement—or any person with
access to a computer—can do just this. Many individuals know of the
power of this technology and have lost a sense that they have privacy
in the curtilage of their home, the area the Supreme Court has described as that which “harbors the intimate activity associated with the
2
sanctity of a man’s home and the privacies of life.”
Most individuals would regard such police activity as a government “search” requiring a warrant. However, under current case law,
this activity does not constitute a search and people have no protection from it or from its effect of eroding their sense of privacy. While
it can be argued this loss of privacy is merely a reflection of our time,
this privacy loss poses significant challenges for contemporary Fourth
Amendment doctrine.
Technologies like the commercially-available satellite imaging
technology, Internet tracking of personal information, or geospatial
locating of cell phones, have created a world unforeseen by the Supreme Court. This is a world in which most people have lost a subjective expectation of privacy and thus any expectation of privacy that
society is objectively willing to accept has eroded. Yet, for the past
forty years, American jurisprudence has primarily defined a search
under the Fourth Amendment as a government examination of an
3
area in which a person has a “reasonable expectation of privacy.”
The utility of this definition is seriously in question because of the
Court’s failure to adequately consider technology’s influence on privacy expectations. Although the Court has made some adjustments
to this search definition over the years, it fails to speak to today’s
problematic reality. Even the Court’s most recent opinion in United

2
3

United States v. Dunn, 480 U.S. 294, 300 (1987) (quoting Oliver v. United States, 466
U.S. 170, 180 (1984)) (internal quotation marks omitted).
Katz v. United States, 389 U.S. 347, 360 (1967) (Harlan, J., concurring).
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4

States v. Jones, where the Court expanded its definition of a search,
fails to keep current with technology. The specific effects of this failure include diminished Fourth Amendment protections.
Although the Court has anticipated a future where it will need to
adjust its search definition, it has not prepared for the present day
reality. The Court announced only that when the government conditions people to have no expectation of privacy, will the Court modify
5
6
its search test to accommodate that reality.
However, today’s privacy threat is not from government conditioning. Commercial activity has created today’s dual reality. First, private
commercial entities have introduced technologies into daily life which
fail to afford individuals the opportunity to demonstrate an expectation of privacy. Without the ability to demonstrate a privacy expectation, the first prong of the Katz test cannot be met. Second, private
commercial entities have conditioned individuals to have no expectation of privacy. If a “search” requires a subjective expectation of privacy that society as a whole accepts, and technology has stripped individuals of any such expectation, then few of the government
examinations will constitute a search and trigger Fourth Amendment
protections. Thus, the public lacks Fourth Amendment protections.
7
Such diminishments, mischaracterized as “voluntar[y],” are more
aptly labeled the products of commercial conditioning.
This Article proposes a legislative solution. Part I examines the
Court’s existing approaches to privacy protections as well as its proposed alternatives when a traditional Katz analysis fails. This review
includes a thorough analysis of the recently articulated frameworks
announced in the majority and concurring opinions of Jones. Part II
utilizes the example of satellite imaging technology to demonstrate
the ubiquity of such publicly-available technologies and the constitu4

5

6

7

United States v. Jones, 132 S. Ct. 945, 949 (2012) (holding that the government’s installation of a global positional system tracking device to a vehicle, and its use of that device to
monitor the vehicle’s movements, constitutes a search under the Fourth Amendment).
Katz, 389 U.S. at 361 (Harlan, J., concurring) (describing the test for governmental violations of the Fourth Amendment as consisting of “a twofold requirement, first that a person have exhibited an actual (subjective) expectation of privacy, and second, that the expectation be one that society is prepared to recognize as ‘reasonable’”).
Smith v. Maryland, 442 U.S. 735, 740 n.5 (1979) (asserting that the Court may engage in
a normative inquiry to determine whether a legitimate expectation of privacy exists in
certain situations, including those where the government conditions subjective expectations of privacy).
Jones, 132 S. Ct. at 957 (Sotomayor, J., concurring) (describing the disclosure of phone
numbers an individual dials to his or her cellular provider and of the URLs an individual
visits to his or her Internet service provider as examples of “information voluntarily disclosed to third parties”).
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tional problem they pose. Part III identifies that, while the Court’s
post-Katz opinions have recognized the limits of the Katz test by anticipating governmental “conditioning” that artificially interferes with the
test, the Court has not anticipated the diminished subjective and objective expectations of privacy resulting from commercial “condition[ing] . . . alien to well-recognized Fourth Amendment free8
doms.”
Here, a comprehensive analysis demonstrates the
inadequacy of the Court’s alternatives, including those suggested in
Jones. This Article proposes a new legislative framework for respecting privacy protections in response to these commercial-induced privacy affronts. This framework, supported by analogous American law
and European proposals, calls for an opt-in model: before an individual can be assumed to have voluntarily sacrificed his privacy, he
must affirmatively opt in to allow the use of his private data. The optin must, however, be meaningful and not an unfair component of a
terms of service agreement.
I. SEARCH JURISPRUDENCE
A. Katz v. United States
The Fourth Amendment affords people the right “to be secure in
their persons, houses, papers, and effects, against unreasonable
9
searches and seizures.” Should the government engage in a search
or seizure, it must do so pursuant to a warrant or an exception to the
10
warrant requirement. These constraints apply only to government
11
searches and seizures.
Therefore, courts must first determine
whether the government’s actions in a given investigation constitute a
“search” at all. If not, then no Fourth Amendment protections are
triggered. Yet the Court has struggled in defining a “search.”
Perhaps as early as Justice Brandeis’s 1890 article, The Right to Pri12
vacy, these questions have been examined through a lens of privacy.
From 1967 through January 2012, the law has almost exclusively ap-

8
9
10

11

12

Smith, 442 U.S. at 740 n.5 (internal quotation marks omitted).
U.S. CONST. amend. IV.
Id. (“[N]o Warrants shall issue, but upon probable cause, supported by Oath or affirmation, and particularly describing the place to be searched, and the persons or things to be
seized.”); see also Kentucky v. King, 131 S. Ct. 1849, 1856 (2011) (illustrating certain reasonable exceptions to the warrant requirement for home searches).
Burdeau v. McDowell, 256 U.S. 465, 467 (1921) (“[T]he Fourth Amendment protects
only against searches and seizures which are made under governmental authority, real or
assumed, or under color of such authority.”).
Warren & Brandeis, supra note 1.
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13

plied the two-pronged Katz test to determine the applicability of the
14
Fourth Amendment to government searches. The test (originally
from Justice Harlan’s concurrence) demands, absent an exception to
the warrant requirement, a search warrant if the government examines an area in which an individual has a “reasonable expectation of
15
privacy.” The reasonableness of this expectation is determined by
establishing that (1) the individual exhibited an actual expectation of
privacy in the location searched (subjective prong); and (2) that expectation is one that society is prepared to accept as reasonable (ob16
jective prong).
Both prongs must be established for the Fourth
Amendment to apply.
Many thought, and the Court at the time of Katz articulated, that
this approach abandoned the previous property-based test for governmental searches: whether there was a physical trespass onto one’s
property. Prior to January 2012, the Court explicitly acknowledged
that Katz discarded a trespass-based analysis, asserting, “[t]he premise
that property interests control the right of the Government to search
17
and seize has been discredited.” Indeed, both litigants in Katz had
framed their arguments around whether the public phone booth at
18
issue was a “constitutionally protected area.” The Court rejected
19
this formulation and reframed the case. In so doing the Court explained that, “the Fourth Amendment protects people, not places.
What a person knowingly exposes to the public, even in his own
13

14

15
16
17
18
19

Katz v. United States, 389 U.S. 347, 361 (1967) (Harlan, J., concurring) (describing the
Court’s Fourth Amendment jurisprudence as imposing “a twofold requirement, first that
a person have exhibited an actual (subjective) expectation of privacy, and second, that
the expectation be one that society is prepared to recognize as ‘reasonable’”).
See, e.g., United States v. Karo, 468 U.S. 705, 712 (1984) (applying the Katz test to the
Government’s installation and monitoring of an electronic tracking device called a
“beeper”); Oliver v. United States, 466 U.S. 170, 177 (1984) (applying the Katz test and
the open fields doctrine to conclude that, although there was a trespass, there was nevertheless no Fourth Amendment violation); Katz, 389 U.S. at 353 (rejecting trespass analysis
in favor of privacy analysis, and finding the government had violated the Fourth Amendment, despite the fact that there was no trespass). As the Court noted in Katz, “[t]he
premise that property interests control the right of the Government to search and seize
has been discredited.” 389 U.S. at 353 (quoting Warden v. Hayden, 387 U.S. 294, 304
(1967)) (internal quotation marks omitted); see also Oliver, 466 U.S. at 183 (quoting the
same language from Katz).
Katz, 389 U.S. at 360 (Harlan, J., concurring).
Id. at 361.
Oliver, 466 U.S. at 183 (quoting Katz, 389 U.S. at 353) (internal quotation marks omitted).
Brief for Petitioner at 2, Katz, 389 U.S. 347 (No. 35); Brief for the Respondent at 2, Katz,
389 U.S. 347 (No. 35).
Katz, 389 U.S. at 350 (“We decline to adopt this formulation of the issues. . . . [T]he correct formulation of Fourth Amendment problems is not necessarily promoted by incantation of the phrase ‘constitutionally protected area.’”).
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home or office, is not a subject of Fourth Amendment protection.
But what he seeks to preserve as private, even in an area accessible to
20
the public, may be constitutionally protected.” In this analysis, the
Court rejected that property-based trespass framework and reframed
the legal issue as whether Katz knowingly exposed information to the
21
public or attempted to keep said information private.
However, nearly half a century later, the Court is again struggling
22
with privacy and the Fourth Amendment. In United States v. Jones,
five Justices recharacterized this jurisprudence to assert that both the
privacy analysis and the physical trespass analysis are part of the current framework in determining whether government activity is a
23
search.
B. Reservations Concerning Katz
Almost since Katz was decided, the Court, in various forms, recognized its limitations.
1. Justice Harlan
Just four short years after articulating the two-pronged test in his
Katz concurrence, its author, Justice Harlan, expressed concern about
24
the misuse of the Court’s approach. In dissent, Justice Harlan questioned the White plurality’s analytical framework of searching for
“subjective expectations or legal attribution of assumption of risk” in
the situation in White, where the police used electronic means to hear
25
what was being said by the defendant. The plurality found that the
defendant’s expectation that his conversation would remain private
26
was unprotected by the Fourth Amendment. It grounded the opinion in, inter alia, the belief that the Amendment “affords no protec20
21

22
23
24
25

26

Id. at 351–52 (citations omitted).
See id. at 352 (“One who occupies [a booth], shuts the door behind him, and pays the toll
that permits him to place a call is surely entitled to assume that the words he utters into
the mouthpiece will not be broadcast to the world.”).
132 S. Ct. 945 (2012).
Id. at 951 (noting that neither Katz nor its progeny terminated the previously recognized
property based protection).
United States v. White, 401 U.S. 745, 786 (1971) (Harlan, J., dissenting) (noting the
shortcomings of the “risk analysis” approach or the “expectations approach of Katz”).
Id. In White, the police monitored the defendant’s conversations by having a confidential
informant wear a radio transmitter during conversations in the informant’s home, a restaurant, the informant’s car, and the defendant’s home. Id. at 746–47. Police who conducted the surveillance testified at trial when the informant was not able to be located.
Id. at 747.
Id. at 749.
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tion to a wrongdoer’s misplaced belief that a person to whom he vol27
untarily confides his wrongdoing will not reveal it.” Justice Harlan
asserted that the plurality’s rote application of these concepts “can,
28
ultimately, lead to the substitution of words for analysis.” He saw the
limitations of this approach in some situations and insisted that the
Court do more than merely assess a defendant’s assumption of risk to
29
his privacy.
Rather, the Court must determine whether the law
30
should require Fourth Amendment protections.
Our expectations, and the risks we assume, are in large part reflections of
laws that translate into rules the customs and values of the past and present. Since it is the task of the law to form and project, as well as mirror
and reflect, we should not, as judges, merely recite the expectations and
31
risks without examining the desirability of saddling them upon society.

Justice Harlan cautioned against rigidly applying a test while losing sight of its purpose. He then urged the search analysis to focus
on the fundamental question: is it right to allow such governmental
activity without the protections of a warrant? He also offered an alternative test rooted in the Court engaging in a more fundamental
analysis. For him “[t]he critical question, therefore, is whether under
our system of government, as reflected in the Constitution, we should
impose on our citizens the risks of the electronic listener or observer
32
without at least the protection of a warrant requirement.” Harlan
proposed answering this question by a balancing test of: (1) “assessing the nature of a particular practice" and (2) “the likely extent
of its impact on the individual’s sense of security balanced against”
33
(3) “the utility of the conduct as a technique of law enforcement.”
2. Justice Blackmun
In Smith v. Maryland, Justice Blackmun, writing for the majority,
also recognized some limits to Katz’s privacy expectation approach.
He acknowledged that “[s]ituations can be imagined, of course, in
which Katz’s two-pronged inquiry would provide an inadequate index
27
28
29
30

31
32
33

Id. (quoting Hoffa v. United States, 385 U.S. 293, 302 (1966)) (internal quotation marks
omitted).
White, 401 U.S. at 786 (Harlan, J., dissenting).
Id.
Id.; see also id. at 788 n.24 (“I am now persuaded that such an approach misconceives the
basic issue, focusing, as it does, on the interests of a particular individual rather than
evaluating the impact of a practice on the sense of security that is the true concern of the
Fourth Amendment’s protection of privacy.”).
Id. at 786 (emphasis added).
Id.
Id.
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34

of Fourth Amendment protection.” He provided examples of such
situations, which included “if the Government were suddenly to announce on nationwide television that all homes henceforth would be
subject to warrantless entry,” and “if a refugee from a totalitarian
country, unaware of this Nation’s traditions, erroneously assumed
that police were continuously monitoring his telephone conversa35
tions.” In each scenario, the individual no longer entertained an actual expectation of privacy. To Blackmun those were circumstances
where an individual’s subjective expectations had been “conditioned” by influences alien to well-recognized Fourth Amendment freedoms, those subjective
expectations obviously could play no meaningful role in ascertaining
what the scope of Fourth Amendment protection was. In determining
whether a “legitimate expectation of privacy” existed in such cases, a
36
normative inquiry would be proper.

The Court recognized that the government should not be permitted to curtail privacy expectations by conditioning individuals to believe they are under intrusive or constant surveillance. Phrased another way, the government cannot destroy an individual’s ability to
establish a subjective expectation of privacy.
Of course, this criticism was expounded upon in 1974 by Anthony
Amsterdam, who challenged the reasonable expectation of privacy
37
test, which he labeled “the common formula for Katz.” Professor
Amsterdam argues that this two-prong test actually “destroys the spirit
38
of Katz and most of Katz’s substance.” Specifically, he argues, “[a]n
actual, subjective expectation of privacy obviously has no place in a
statement of what Katz held or in a theory of what the [F]ourth
39
[A]mendment protects.” Similar to Justice Blackmun’s examples in
Smith, Amsterdam asserts that if “an actual, subjective expectation of
privacy” could “add to, . . . [or in] its absence, detract from, an individual’s claim to [F]ourth [A]mendment protection,” then “the government could diminish each person’s subjective expectation of privacy merely by announcing half-hourly on television . . . that we were
all forthwith being placed under comprehensive electronic surveil-

34

35
36
37
38
39

Smith v. Maryland, 442 U.S. 735, 740 n.5 (1979). In Smith, the Court held that no search
occurred when a telephone company, acting at the request of the police, placed a pen
register on Smith’s phone, thereby confirming that he was the person placing harassing
phone calls to the victim.
Id. (emphasis added).
Id. (emphasis added).
Anthony G. Amsterdam, Perspectives on the Fourth Amendment, 58 MINN. L. REV. 349, 385
(1974).
Id. at 383.
Id. at 384.
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40

lance.”
Amsterdam shares Blackmun’s concern, but even more
darkly asserts that the action Blackmun warned of had already occurred. He opines that police surveillance in the 1970s already was
ubiquitous and resulted in little, if any, basis for a privacy expecta41
tion. Neither Blackmun nor Amsterdam, however, envisioned what
appears to be happening today—individuals are being “conditioned”
by commercial influences alien to well-recognized Fourth Amendment freedoms. Individuals are losing their right to privacy due to
commercial forces removing that expectation without affording individuals the opportunity to demonstrate a privacy expectation.
3. Justice Scalia and Kyllo
Justice Scalia has been a longstanding critic of the Katz test, noting
at one point that “the only thing . . . established about the Katz
test . . . is that, unsurprisingly, those actual (subjective) expectations
of privacy that society is prepared to recognize as reasonable, bear an
uncanny resemblance to those expectations of privacy that this Court
42
considers reasonable.” In 2001 Justice Scalia continued his criticism
43
of the Katz approach in Kyllo v. United States. Writing for the majority, Justice Scalia concluded that police use of a thermal imaging device aimed at a private home from a public street to detect relative
amounts of heat within a home constituted a search within the mean44
ing of the Fourth Amendment. In so doing, Justice Scalia neither
45
relied upon nor embraced Katz, but echoed his previous criticism.
Asserting that “[i]t would be foolish to contend that the degree of
privacy secured to citizens by the Fourth Amendment has been entirely unaffected by the advance of technology,” Justice Scalia instead
focused his analysis on the fact that officers had surveilled Kyllo’s
46
home. The Court held that “obtaining by sense-enhancing technology any information regarding the interior of the home that could
not otherwise have been obtained without physical ‘intrusion into a
constitutionally protected area’ constitutes a search—at least where
40
41
42

43
44
45
46

Id.
Id. (“I have had no actual, subjective expectation of privacy in my telephone, my office or
my home since I began handling civil rights cases in the early 1960’s [sic].”).
Minnesota v. Carter, 525 U.S. 83, 97 (1998) (Scalia, J., concurring) (alteration omitted)
(citations omitted) (internal quotation marks omitted) (quoting Katz v. United States,
389 U.S. 347, 361 (1967) (Harlan, J., concurring)).
533 U.S. 27, 34 (2001) (Scalia, J.) (citing sources that are critical of Katz).
Id.
Id. (noting criticisms that describe the Katz test as “circular, and hence subjective and unpredictable”).
Id. at 33–34.
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(as here) the technology in question is not in general public use.”
When technology facilitated a search, which previously would have
required physical trespass, his analysis considers two important factors: (1) whether the target of the search is a home, and (2) whether
48
the technology was in general public use.
Justice Scalia’s return to a common law trespass-based analysis is
not without its critics. As will be discussed infra, many of these arguments are summarized by Justice Alito in Jones. Justice Alito laid out
five objections to Justice Scalia’s approach in Jones, including that it
49
had “little if any support in current Fourth Amendment case law.”
He also referenced misplaced significance, incongruent results, and a
50
lack of uniformity among states. Justice Alito argued that twentyfirst century technology issues should not be settled utilizing eight51
eenth century tort law. Justice Alito’s major critique, that such an
52
approach has been rejected by the Court, is not without merit.
C. United States v. Jones
In Jones, the Court had the opportunity to address the government’s use of technology to conduct surveillance. In Jones, the police
53
suspected the defendant of involvement in the narcotics trade. In
an effort to gather information, they subjected him to twenty-four
54
hour surveillance by placing a GPS device on his automobile. This
surveillance lasted twenty-eight days and required the police to physi55
cally trespass the vehicle a second time to replace the battery. The
56
GPS ultimately produced approximately 2000 pages of information.
47
48
49
50
51
52

53
54

55
56

Id. at 34 (citation omitted) (quoting Silverman v. United States, 365 U.S. 505, 512
(1961)).
Id. at 34, 40.
United States v. Jones, 132 S. Ct. 945, 958 (2012) (Alito, J., concurring).
Id. at 961.
Id. at 962.
See, e.g., Katz v. United States, 389 U.S. 347, 353 (1967) (concluding that “the reach of
[the Fourth] Amendment cannot turn upon the presence or absence of a physical intrusion,” and that “‘trespass’ doctrine . . . can no longer be regarded as controlling”); Warden v. Hayden, 387 U.S. 294, 304 (1967) (“The premise that property interests control
the right of the Government to search and seize has been discredited.”); Amsterdam, supra note 37, at 357 (describing the Supreme Court’s rejection in Katz of the “concept of
‘constitutionally protected areas’”).
Jones, 132 S. Ct. at 948.
Id. Although the vehicle was registered to Jones’s wife, it was primarily operated by Jones.
Id. at 949 n.2. In actuality, the government had obtained a search warrant, but failed to
adhere to its terms. Id. at 948. Thus, it had to defend its actions as if no warrant had
been obtained. Id. at 948 n.1.
Id. at 948.
Id.
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The government used some of this information to link the defendant
57
to the location where narcotics were situated.
The Court granted certiorari to determine, among other questions, whether the attachment of a GPS tracking device to a vehicle
for approximately four weeks constituted a search within the mean58
ing of the Fourth Amendment. All nine Justices concluded that
59
such activity constituted a search. Unfortunately, the case produced
three separate opinions, which arrived at this result in three very different ways. The Court missed an opportunity to reframe the question of privacy so as to reflect twenty-first century realities.
Justice Scalia, writing for the five-Justice majority, held that “the
Government’s installation of a GPS device on a target’s vehicle, and
its use of that device to monitor the vehicle’s movements, constitutes
60
a ‘search.’” In so doing, Justice Scalia minimized the importance of
the Katz test, stating that “Jones’s Fourth Amendment rights do not
61
rise or fall with the Katz formulation.” Rather, the majority asserted
that the fundamental mission of the Court was not to reflect current
privacy expectations, but to “‘assur[e] preservation of that degree of
privacy against government that existed when the Fourth Amend62
ment was adopted.’” To reflect this eighteenth century standard,
the Court returned to a trespass analysis:
[F]or most of our history the Fourth Amendment was understood to embody a particular concern for government trespass upon the areas (“persons, houses, papers, and effects”) it enumerates. Katz did not repudiate
that understanding. . . . “We do not believe that Katz, by holding that the
Fourth Amendment protects persons and their private conversations, was
intended to withdraw any of the protection which the Amendment ex63
tends to the home. . . .”

57
58

59
60
61
62
63

Id. at 948–49.
Id. at 948. Originally the Court was poised to answer two questions. The question presented by the parties was “[w]hether the warrantless use of a tracking device on respondent’s vehicle to monitor its movements on public streets violated the Fourth Amendment.” Petition for a Writ of Certiorari at i, Jones, 132 S. Ct. 945 (2011) (No. 10-1259).
However, the Court added the second question—whether attaching a GPS tracking device to a vehicle for approximately four weeks constituted a Fourth Amendment search—
and ultimately only resolved that question, leaving the propriety of the monitoring without physical trespass and a warrant unresolved. Jones, 131 S. Ct. at 948.
Jones, 132 S. Ct. at 949; id. at 954 (Sotomayor, J., concurring); id. at 964 (Alito, J., concurring).
Id. at 949 (majority opinion) (footnote omitted).
Id. at 950.
Id. (alteration in original) (internal quotation marks omitted) (quoting Kyllo v. United
States, 533 U.S. 27, 34 (2001)).
Jones, 132 S. Ct. at 950–51 (alterations omitted) (emphasis added) (footnote omitted)
(quoting U.S. CONST. amend. IV; Alderman v. United States, 394 U.S. 165, 180 (1969)).
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The Jones majority explicitly states that trespass is not the exclusive
64
test, or alone sufficient to evaluate Fourth Amendment liability.
However, the Jones Court also concludes that Katz did not erode the
physical trespass analysis or the principle that “when the government
does engage in physical intrusion of a constitutionally protected area
in order to obtain information, that intrusion may constitute a viola65
tion of the Fourth Amendment.” Thus, although the Court in Jones
did not overturn Katz, Justice Scalia in essence reduced it to a supplement to the primary concern of physical trespass.
Justice Alito, with whom Justices Ginsburg, Breyer, and Kagan
joined, concurred in judgment but rejected the reversion to a trespass analysis. Justice Alito concurred that the GPS surveillance in this
66
case was a search by applying the traditional Katz test. That is to say
he “would analyze . . . this case by asking whether respondent’s reasonable expectations of privacy were violated by the long-term moni64

65

66

Jones, 132 S. Ct. at 950–51, 951 n.5 (“Trespass alone does not qualify, but there must be
conjoined with that what was present here: an attempt to find something or to obtain information.”).
Id. at 951 (quoting United States v. Knotts, 460 U.S. 276, 286 (1983) (Brennan, J., concurring)) (internal quotation marks omitted). The majority’s support for this claim that
Katz did not replace the trespass analysis but supplemented it is somewhat dubious. The
main support for this proposition is the concurring opinions and the responses therein to
the cases Justice Alito cites in his concurrence as evidence that the trespass doctrine has
been overturned. Compare Jones, 132 S. Ct. at 947, 951 (citing Soldal v. Cook County, 506
U.S. 56, 60, 62, 64 (1992); Alderman v. United States, 394 U.S. 165, 180 (1969)) (listing
precedential Supreme Court cases as support for the proposition that the Katz reasonable
expectation of privacy test supplemented the common law trespass test, instead of replacing it); with Jones, 132 S. Ct. at 960 (Alito, J., concurring) (“The majority suggests that two
post-Katz decisions show that a technical trespass is sufficient to establish the existence of
a search, but they provide little support.” (citations omitted) (citing Soldal, 506 U.S. at 56;
Alderman, 394 U.S. at 165)). For examples of cases cited by Justice Alito in his dissent in
support of his claim that Katz eliminated the trespass doctrine, see Jones, 132 S. Ct. at 959
(Alito, J., concurring) (“This trespass based rule was repeatedly criticized. . . [Katz] finally
did away with the old approach, holding that a trespass was not required for a Fourth Amendment violation.” (emphasis added) (citing Katz v. United States, 389 U.S. 347 (1967))); id.
at 960 (“The existence of a property right is but one element in determining whether expectations of privacy are legitimate. The premise that property interests control the right
of the Government to search and seize has been discredited.” (quoting Oliver v. United
States, 466 U.S. 170, 183 (1984)) (internal quotation marks omitted)); id. (quoting Rakas
v. Illinois, 439 U.S. 128, 143 (1978) (citing a description that characterized Katz as holding that the “capacity to claim the protection of the Fourth Amendment depends not upon a property right in the invaded place but upon whether the person who claims the
protection of the Amendment has a legitimate expectation of privacy in the invaded
place”)); id. (quoting Kyllo v. United States, 533 U.S. 27, 32 (2001) (“We have since decoupled violation of a person’s Fourth Amendment rights from trespassory violation of
his property . . . .”)); id. (quoting United States v. Karo, 468 U.S. 705, 713 (1984) (“[A]n
actual trespass is neither necessary nor sufficient to establish a constitutional violation.”)).
Jones, 132 S. Ct. at 964 (Alito, J., concurring) (finding that the GPS surveillance was a
search under a test that “appl[ies] existing Fourth Amendment doctrine”).

Nov. 2012]

MISSED OPPORTUNITY

343
67

toring of the movements of the vehicle he drove.” He concluded
under a pure Katz analysis “that the lengthy monitoring that occurred
68
in this case constituted a search under Fourth Amendment.” Notwithstanding that conclusion, Justice Alito left open the possibility
that shorter term monitoring might “accord[] with expectations of
69
privacy that our society has recognized as reasonable.” In so doing,
Justice Alito vigorously protested the majority’s resurrection of the
70
trespass approach, which he regarded as discredited. “In sum, the
majority is hard pressed to find support in post-Katz cases for its tres71
pass-based theory.” Nevertheless, Justice Alito acknowledged that a
Katz analysis is at times inadequate in an era of increasing technolog72
ical surveillance, and appealed for a legislative response.
Justice Sotomayor joined Justice Scalia’s opinion that “the Katz
reasonable-expectation-of-privacy test has been added to, not substi73
tuted for, the common law trespassory test,” but she also wrote sepa74
rately, agreeing in substance with much of Justice Alito’s opinion.
67
68
69
70
71

72

73

74

Id. at 958.
Id. at 964.
Id.
See id. at 959–61 (describing the historical discrediting of the trespass approach); see also
Katz, 389 U.S. at 353 (discrediting trespass analysis).
Jones, 132 S. Ct. at 961 (Alito, J., concurring). Justice Alito also cited four additional flaws
with the majority opinion; he pointed out that the majority’s approach: (1) disregards
the significance of long-term GPS tracking but misplaces significance by emphasizing instead the trivial act of placing the device on a car; (2) produces incongruous results in
which a GPS attachment, no matter how brief, automatically triggers a search, but comprehensive twenty-four-hour monitoring through aerial and visual surveillance does not;
(3) produces different results from state to state based on the property laws of the states;
and (4) presents “particularly vexing problems in cases involving surveillance that is carried out by making electronic, as opposed to physical, contact with the item to be
tracked.” Id. at 961–62.
Id. at 964 (citation omitted) (“In circumstances involving dramatic technological change,
the best solution to privacy concerns may be legislative. A legislative body is well situated
to gauge changing public attitudes, to draw detailed lines, and to balance privacy and
public safety in a comprehensive way.” (citing Orin S. Kerr, The Fourth Amendment and New
Technologies: Constitutional Myths and the Case for Caution, 102 MICH. L. REV. 801, 805–06
(2004) (advocating for legislatures, rather than the judiciary, to be the mechanism for
creating “the primary investigative rules when technology is changing”))); see also Eric
Lichtblau, Police are Using Phone Tracking as Routine Tool, N.Y. TIMES, Apr. 1, 2012, at 1, 20
(discussing law enforcement’s use of cell phone technology in surveillance and tracing
for both emergencies and routine investigations).
Jones, 132 S. Ct. at 952 (emphasis omitted); see id. at 955 (Sotomayor, J., concurring) (“As
the majority’s opinion makes clear, however, Katz’s reasonable-expectation-of-privacy test
augmented, but did not displace or diminish, the common-law trespassory test that preceded it.”).
Id. (Sotomayor, J., concurring) (“Under that rubric [wherein technological advances
make nontrespassory surveillance possible and shape societal privacy expectations], I
agree with Justice Alito that, at the very least, ‘longer term GPS monitoring in investiga-
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Like Justice Scalia, she asserted that Fourth Amendment protections
include, at a minimum, protection from physical trespass, as well as
the Katz protection of privacy when the trespass analysis is not appli75
cable. However, she did not seem assured that the sole answer to
these contemporary challenges lay in eighteenth century truisms.
Justice Sotomayor, more so than either Justice Scalia or Justice Alito,
was particularly concerned about the increased ability of law enforcement to use modern techniques to search without physical in76
trusion through technological advancement. She went further than
Justice Alito, stating that “cases involving even short-term monitor77
ing . . . require particular attention.” She explicitly expressed a desire that the jurisprudence reflect an understanding of the technological realities of contemporary surveillance. She noted concern about
the high volume of information which could be obtained from twen78
ty-four hour monitoring of one’s vehicle through a GPS device, the
danger of entrusting the government to use a tool “so amenable to
79
80
misuse,” and the questionable validity of the Third Party Doctrine
in an age when technology requires people to “reveal a great deal of
information about themselves to third parties in the course of carry81
ing out mundane tasks.”
II. SURVEILLANCE, OBTAINING INFORMATION, AND SATELLITE IMAGING
TECHNOLOGY
The Supreme Court majority’s recent articulation in Jones that the
Fourth Amendment can be implicated when the government trespasses and engages in an “attempt to find something or to obtain in-

75
76

77
78
79
80

81

tions of most offenses impinges on expectations of privacy.’” (citing Jones, 132 S. Ct. at
964 (Alito, J., concurring))).
Id. at 954–55.
Id. at 955. (“[P]hysical intrusion is now unnecessary to many forms of surveillance. . . . GPS monitoring generates a precise, comprehensive record of a person’s public movements that reflects a wealth of detail about her familial, political, professional, religious, and sexual associations.”).
Id.
Id.
Id. at 956.
The Third Party Doctrine asserts that the Fourth Amendment allows “the obtaining of
information revealed to a third party and conveyed by [the third party] to Government
authorities, even if the information is revealed on the assumption that it will be used only
for a limited purpose and the confidence placed in the third party will not be betrayed.”
United States v. Miller, 425 U.S. 435, 443 (1976).
Jones, 132 S. Ct. at 957 (Sotomayor, J., concurring).
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82

formation” possibly has significant implications. This description of
the Fourth Amendment may implicate technologies that allow the
same access to information that a physical trespass would permit. By
way of example, police use of satellite imaging technology to examine
an individual’s private property is “an attempt to obtain information”
without a physical trespass.
Today, law enforcement, and any individual with Internet access
for that matter, has the ability to use a high-powered satellite to examine the property of another in some detail, no matter where in the
world the property is located. No warrant is required because this
likely will not constitute a search under the Court’s current definition. The individual subject of such surveillance has no choice in
this, regardless of what he does to deny public access to his property.
While such examinations are not real time video footage of property,
they do allow observation of relatively recent images of one’s property
and comparison of these images over time. Thus, the viewer could
observe the presence or absence of structures, machinery, crops,
meeting places, vehicles, activities, etc. Furthermore, examination of
real time imaging is certainly technologically possible and may soon
83
also reach commercial viability. While a detailed analysis of how this
technology works is beyond the scope of this Article, a brief understanding of the technology is helpful in analyzing its impact on privacy.
The ability to engage in this surveillance is possible through a
combination of satellite imaging technology and software processing.
Satellite imaging technology is a component of currently-existing
technology that allows one to access images of a specific location in
the world and zoom in to obtain a view from the equivalent of approximately five meters away. A common example of this is Google
Earth, one of the many commercially-available services that provides

82

83

Id. at 951 n.5 (majority opinion) (“Likewise with a search. Trespass alone does not qualify, but there must be conjoined with that what was present here: an attempt to find
something or to obtain information.”).
This could occur through satellite images or, more likely, drones. See JAY STANLEY &
CATHERINE CRUMP, AM. CIVIL LIBERTIES UNION, PROTECTING PRIVACY FROM AERIAL
SURVEILLANCE: RECOMMENDATIONS FOR GOVERNMENT USE OF DRONE AIRCRAFT 2–10
(2011), available at http://www.aclu.org/technology-and-liberty/report-protectingprivacy-aerial-surveillance-recommendations-government-use (examining the use of
drones at all levels of law enforcement and FAA efforts to develop policy to facilitate such
use); Brian Bennett, Police employ Predator drone spy planes on home front, L.A. TIMES, Dec.
10, 2011, http://articles.latimes.com/print/2011/dec/10/nation/la-na-drone-arrest20111211 (discussing the use of U.S. Customs and Border Protection drones by local police).
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access to satellite images and enhances them for more detail. Com85
bined with Google Street View, this technology allows law enforcement—or anyone else—to access pictures of one’s property through
a powerful satellite and observe how said area changes over time.
Google Earth images are sourced from not only satellite imagery, but
also from aerial photography and data from many imagery provid86
ers. Google describes its service as allowing one to “[v]iew satellite
imagery, maps, terrain, 3D buildings, galaxies far in space, and the
87
deepest depths of the ocean.” While other companies provide this
service, Google Earth is paramount among them due to the large
88
amount of media coverage it receives.
The road to this technology becoming commonly available at no
cost to the customer began in 2004, when Google acquired the soft89
ware company Keyhole Corporation. At the time of this acquisition,
the parties described Keyhole as allowing one to “fly like a superhero
from your computer at home to a street corner somewhere else in the
90
world.” At that time, Google described the acquisition as giving
Google users
a powerful new search tool, enabling users to view 3D images of any place
on earth as well as tap a rich database of roads, businesses and many other points of interest. . . . With an Internet connection, users enter an address or other location information and Keyhole’s software accesses the
database and takes them to a digital image of that location on their com84

85

86

87
88

89
90

GOOGLE EARTH, http://www.google.com/earth/index.html (last visited Sept. 9, 2012); see
also BING MAPS, http://www.bing.com/maps/ (last visited Sept. 20, 2012); YAHOO! MAPS,
http://maps.yahoo.com (last visited Sept. 9, 2012).
Street View, GOOGLE MAPS, http://www.google.com/streetview (last visited Oct. 21, 2012)
(“Google Maps with Street View lets you explore places around the world through 360degree street-level imagery.”).
See Support FAQs: “What data does TerraMetrics provide to Google Earth and Google Maps?”,
TERRAMETRICS, http://truearth.com/support/faqs_content_google.htm (last visited
Sept. 19, 2012) (detailing the composited data of which Google Earth and Google Maps
are comprised, and attributing the satellite imagery provided to by TerraMetrics).
Google Earth for Desktop, GOOGLE EARTH, http://www.google.com/earth/explore/
products/desktop.html (last visited Sept. 9, 2012).
See, e.g., Dan Fletcher, Top 10 Google Earth Finds, TIME, http://www.time.com/time/
specials/packages/article/0,28804,1881770_1881787_1881774,00.html (last visited Sept.
9, 2012) (devoting an online slideshow to ten “of the most unusual discoveries” found by
Google Earth users); Andrew C. Revkin, Google Earth Dives Deep, Filling In Its Maps’ Watery
Gaps, N.Y. TIMES, Feb. 3, 2009, at D3 (detailing the functionality and newly developed features of Google Earth); Iain Thomson, Upgrade eliminates Atlantis from Google
Earth, REGISTER (Feb. 6, 2012), http://www.theregister.co.uk/2012/02/06/google_
earth_atlantis/ (reporting an update to the Google Earth software that eliminated an image which some had believed to be evidence of the lost city of Atlantis).
Google Acquires Keyhole Corp, NEWS FROM GOOGLE (Oct. 27, 2004), http://googlepress.
blogspot.com/2004/10/google-acquires-keyhole-corp.html.
Id.
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puter screen. The interactive software then gives users many options, including the ability to zoom in from space-level to street-level, tilt and ro91
tate the view or search for other information . . . .

Google later contracted with high resolution satellite companies,
such as DigitalGlobe and GeoEye, which launch satellites and provide
92
the imagery to Google. These companies describe these images as
93
“high-quality images.” Some of the satellites owned by such companies have the capacity to record images at fifty centimeter resolu94
tion. One such company explains that this level of detail allows customers to “map natural and man-made features to within five meters
(about sixteen feet) of their actual location on the surface of the
95
Earth.” Another describes this level of detail as allowing a viewer to
discriminate between grass and trees, and to examine a road and de96
termine whether it is in need of resurfacing. However, Google also
supplements these images with other images obtained by aircraft,
97
some of whose resolutions are as high as thirty to sixty centimeters.
Today, Google Earth has continued to grow in its abilities to develop images from anywhere in the world. Google uses satellites
owned by third-party operators, most of which are private, but at least

91
92

93

94

95
96

97

Id.
See GeoEye & Google, GEOEYE, http://www.geoeye.com/GeoEye101/GeoEyeGoogle/Default.aspx (last visited Sept. 9, 2012) (promoting Google’s use of GeoEye-1
satellite imagery on its Google Earth and Google Maps platforms); see also History: The
Growth
of
the
Business,
DIGITALGLOBE,
http://www.digitalglobe.com/aboutus/history#/the-growth-of-the-business (last visited Sept. 9, 2012) (noting the digital satellite imagery agreement between DigitalGlobe and Google, which dates back to 2002);
Support FAQs: “What data does TerraMetrics provide to Google Earth and Google Maps?”,
http://truearth.com/support/faqs_content_google.htm (last visited Sept. 19, 2012) (attributing the “baselayer imagery” provided to Google Earth and Google Maps to TerraMetrics TruEarth technology).
SPOT: Looking Down On Earth, CNES, http://www.cnes.fr/web/CNES-en/1415-spot.php
(last updated Aug. 2009) (chronicling the history of the “Satellite Pour l’Observation de
la Terre” (SPOT satellites)).
See High-Resolution Imagery, Resolution Modes, GEOEYE, http://www.geoeye.com/
GeoEye101/satellite-imagery/high-resolution-imagery.aspx (last visited Sept. 21, 2012)
(observing that though the GeoEye-1 satellite can record images at forty-one centimeter
resolution, which allows one to view “home plate on a baseball field,” the National Oceanic and Atmosphere Administration requires satellite imaging companies to convert these
images to fifty centimeter resolution for commercial use).
Collecting Images with GeoEye-1, GEOEYE, http://www.geoeye.com/GeoEye101/satelliteimagery/collection-method.aspx (last visited Sept. 9, 2012).
DIGITALGLOBE, THE BENEFITS OF THE EIGHT SPECTRAL BANDS OF WORLDVIEW-2, at 3–7
(Mar. 2010), available at http://www.digitalglobe.com/downloads/white-papers/DG8SPECTRAL-WP.pdf (“The high spatial resolution enables the discrimination of fine details, like vehicles, shallow reefs and even individual trees in an orchard . . . .”).
Precision Aerial, DIGITALGLOBE, http://www.digitalglobe.com/downloads/AerialProgramDS-AP-Web.pdf (last visited Sept. 21, 2012).
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some of which are related to some government agencies. Each of
these third parties has numerous satellites, which vary in ability to
record data. Generally, these satellites travel a certain orbit that allows them to orbit the Earth as many as fifteen times a day, with a
more typical frequency of from once every 1.1 days to once every 5.9
99
days. While in orbit, they can observe land for a lengthy period of
time. They do not provide live pictures with a live feed to the Internet. Rather, the images are collected, uploaded, stored, transmitted,
100
and processed before being placed on the Internet. Although not
live, the ability to quickly produce photographs has been demonstrated by recent satellite images from the capsizing of the Costa
Concordia, as well as satellite images relating to national security
101
concerns, such as images of the Chinese aircraft carrier Varyag.
98

99

100

101

See History:
The Early Years, DIGITALGLOBE, http://www.digitalglobe.com/aboutus/history (last visited Sept. 9, 2012) (“In 1993, the United States Department of Commerce granted DigitalGlobe . . . the first license allowing a private enterprise to build and
operate a satellite system to gather high-resolution digital imagery of the Earth for commercial sale.”); About CNES, CNES, http://www.cnes.fr/web/CNES-en/3773-aboutcnes.php, (last visited Sept. 9, 2012) (“[T]he Centre National d’Etudes Spatiales (CNES)
is the government agency responsible for shaping and implementing France’s space policy in Europe.”); About Us, GEOEYE, http://www.geoeye.com/CorpSite/aboutus/Default.aspx (last visited Sept. 9, 2012) (“The Company’s growing global sales network
currently comprises 12 strategic business partners (government and commercial) . . . .”);
About Us: Company Info, TERRAMETRICS, http://www.truearth.com/about_info/company_
content.htm (last visited Sept. 9, 2012) (“TerraMetrics provides . . . technologies to a
broad customer base including U.S. Department of Defense agencies, the National Aeronautics and Space Administration (NASA), . . . [and] international governments . . . .”).
See Collecting Images with GeoEye-1, GEOEYE, http://www.geoeye.com/GeoEye101/satelliteimagery/collection-method.aspx (last visited Sept. 9, 2012) (listing the features and specifications of the GeoEye-1 satellite); Design and Specifications: Quickbird, DIGITALGLOBE,
http://www.digitalglobe.com/downloads/QuickBird-DS-QB-Web.pdf (last visited Sept.
21, 2012) (listing the features and specifications of the Quickbird satellite); Design and
Specifications: WorldView-1, DIGITALGLOBE, http://www.digitalglobe.com/downloads/
WorldView1-DS-WV1-Web.pdf (last visited Sept. 21, 2012) (listing the features and specifications of the WorldView-1 satellite); Design and Specifications:
WorldView-2,
DIGITALGLOBE, http://www.digitalglobe.com/downloads/WorldView2-DS-WV2-Web.pdf
(last visited Sept. 21, 2012) (listing the features and specifications of the WorldView-2 satellite); SPOT satellite technical data, CNES, http://spot5.cnes.fr/gb/programme/111.htm
(last visited Sept. 9, 2012) (listing the features and specifications of the SPOT-5 satellite).
See A highly effective operational system, CNES, http://spot5.cnes.fr/gb/systeme/
systeme.htm (last visited Sept. 21, 2012) (specifying that two operators that conduct a series of separate processes are required to produce final images from the SPOT satellites,
including a satellite operator that manages the performance of the satellite and a commercial operator that processes, generates, and distributes the resulting images); Technical features and operation, CNES, http://www.cnes.fr/web/CNES-en/1420-technicalfeatures-and-operation.php (last visited Sept. 21, 2012) (explicating the technical processes by which SPOT satellites record and transmit images to stations on the ground).
Satellite Spots Costa Concordia Shipwreck from Space, SPACE.COM (Jan. 18, 2012),
http://www.space.com/14273-satellite-photo-costa-concordia-cruise-shipwreck.html (re-
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DigitalGlobe, one of the third-party satellite operators, has promised
that its next generation of satellites will possess enough speed to re102
examine the same geographical location within twenty-four hours.
Another company, Centre National d’Etudes Spaciales (“CNES”), asserts that its satellites can work in tandem to cover a 120 kilometer
swath of land in a single pass, and in some cases can acquire imagery
103
of any point in the globe in less than three days.
Another asserts
that its satellites have average revisit times of 1.1 day for the entire
104
globe.
While these satellites are owned primarily by third parties, some
possess a nexus with government activity. For example, the Spot 5
Program is run by CNES, the French government agency responsible
105
for shaping France’s space policy.
Indeed, CNES argues that its
“Earth observation satellites are vital asset [sic] for science, industry
and the military alike. Carrying ever-enhanced viewing instruments,
they can acquire repeat coverage of vast areas systematically and yield
106
very detailed images.”
Similarly, Google has an exclusive contract
107
for online use of imagery supplied by GeoEye, a company that was
also awarded a 3.8 billion dollar contract with the National Geospa-

102

103

104

105

106
107

porting on a photograph taken on January 17, 2012 by DigitalGlobe satellites of the capsized Costa Concordia, a cruise ship that wrecked off the coast of Italy on January 13,
2012); Stephen Wood, Capturing the Varyag, DIGITALGLOBE BLOG (Dec. 19, 2011),
http://www.digitalglobeblog.com/2011/12/19/capturing-the-varyag-stephen-wood-vpanalysis-center/ (discussing the documentation in DigitalGlobe satellite images of the second sea trial of the Chinese aircraft carrier known as the Varyag).
See WorldView-3, DIGITALGLOBE, http://www.digitalglobe.com/downloads/WorldView3DS-WV3-Web.pdf (last visited Sept. 21, 2012) (attesting that “WorldView-3 has an average
revisit time of [less than one] day”).
Instrument Features, CNES, http://spot5.cnes.fr/gb/satellite/42.htm (last visited Sept. 9,
2012) (explaining that, although HRG “instruments generally operate independently to
observe separate targets,” they can “view in tandem to cover a 120-kilometre swath in a
single pass” and “can acquire imagery of any point on the globe within less than five days,
or even in less than three days at temperate latitudes”).
See DIGITALGLOBE, THE BENEFITS OF THE EIGHT SPECTRAL BANDS OF WORLDVIEW-2, at 3
(Mar. 21, 2012), available at http://www.digitalglobe.com/downloads/white-papers/DG8SPECTRAL-WP.pdf (advertising that, among other features, DigitalGlobe’s “second next
generation” satellite, WorldView-2, will “offer average revisit times of 1.1 days around the
globe”).
See About CNES, CNES, http://www.cnes.fr/web/CNES-en/3773-about-cnes.php (last visited Sept. 9, 2012) (“Founded in 1961, the Centre National d’Etudes Spatiales (CNES) is
the government agency responsible for shaping and implementing France’s space policy
in Europe. Its task is to invent the space systems of the future, bring space technologies
to maturity and guarantee France’s independent access to space.”).
Observing Earth, CNES, http://spot5.cnes.fr/gb/applications/21.htm (last visited Sept. 9,
2012).
Stephen Shankland, Google to buy GeoEye Satellite Imagery, CNET NEWS (Aug. 29, 2008, 7:27
AM), http://news.cnet.com/8301-1023_3-10028842-93.html.
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108

tial-Intelligence Agency, which is GeoEye’s largest customer, ac109
counting for 65% percent of its revenue in 2009.
Google has expanded this effort through Google Street View,
which was launched in the United States in 2007 and is now available
110
throughout the world. This service provides “360-degree panoram111
Google obtains these
ic views” of streets on all seven continents.
images through a fleet of vehicles with nine cameras and Wi-Fi an112
tennas mounted upon them that capture and store wireless data.
For locations inaccessible to vehicles, Google creates smaller vehicles
113
described as “Google Trikes.” According to Google, “the latest car
has [fifteen] lenses taking 360 degrees of photos. It also has motion
sensors to track its position, a hard drive to store data, a small computer running the system, and lasers to capture 3D data to determine
114
distances . . . .”
The cameras are stationed nearly nine feet high
and “allow[] Google to peer over fences to photograph [images not
115
visible] to an ordinary person walking down the street.” Additionally, the Street View user can zoom in on images well beyond what the
116
ordinary observer can see.
With this technology in the hands of government officials, the implications for police surveillance are significant. A common sense
approach would suggest that police use of these satellites to examine
an individual’s property from five meters above the ground is a
search. However, under a traditional analysis, it may not be a search.
First, people cannot demonstrate subjective expectations of privacy
because companies like Google never afford them the opportunity to
demonstrate such expectations by opting out of the imaging. Second, many individuals are aware of the technology’s use, and society,

108

109
110

111
112
113
114
115
116

GeoEye Wins National Geospatial-Intelligence Agency Enhanced View Award, SPACE DAILY (Aug.
10 2010) http://www.spacedaily.com/reports/GeoEye_Wins_National_Geospatial_Intelli
gence_Agency_Enhanced_View_Award_999.html.
A. Ananthalakshmi, UPDATE 1–GeoEye Q2 profit beats Street view, REUTERS (Aug. 10, 2009),
http://www.reuters.com/article/2009/08/10/geoeye-idUSBNG50871620090810.
See In re Google Inc. Street View Elec. Commc’ns Litig., 794 F. Supp. 2d 1067, 1070 (N.D.
Cal. 2011) (noting that Google Street View has expanded to more than thirty countries
worldwide).
Id. at 1070–71; Street View: Cars, Trikes, and More, GOOGLE MAPS, http://maps.google.com
/help/maps/streetview/learn/cars-trikes-and-more.html (last visited Sept. 20, 2012).
Google, 794 F. Supp. at 1071.
Id.
Street View: Cars, Trikes, and More, supra note 111.
Roger C. Geissler, Note, Private Eyes Watching You: Google Street View and the Right to an Inviolate Personality, 63 HASTINGS L.J. 897, 902 (2012).
Id. at 902–03.
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therefore, lacks an objective acceptance of any expectation of privacy.
Thus, individuals are powerless to stop this privacy encroachment.
III. THE PROBLEM IS NOT TRESPASS OR GOVERNMENT USE OF
TECHNOLOGY: THE PROBLEM IS UBIQUITOUS ELECTRONIC
SURVEILLANCE BY COMMERCIAL ENTITIES AND ITS EFFECT ON
INDIVIDUALS
As recognized to some degree by Justices Alito and Sotomayor in
their Jones concurring opinions, technological advances have altered
the landscape significantly since 1967. This role of technology is not
a new revelation. As early as 1890, Warren and Brandeis recognized
that technological advances demand the law move toward privacy
117
protection. In 2010 the Court acknowledged the role of technology
in determining conceptions of privacy, stating that “[r]apid changes
in the dynamics of communication and information transmission are
evident not just in the technology itself but in what society accepts as
118
proper behavior.”
The Court further cautioned against ruling on
such questions until a new technology’s role in society becomes
119
clear. Technological development of the telephone pushed Fourth
Amendment jurisprudence forward in Katz to recognize that the old
way of measuring a search, the physical trespass, was no longer solely
sufficient to protect what was deemed as private under the Fourth
120
Amendment. So too we now find ourselves in need of a twenty-first
century solution.
Although there is significant disagreement between Justices Scalia
and Alito as to whether Katz discarded the trespass approach to
searches, it appears that post-Jones, courts must first engage in a trespass analysis, and if that fails, they can then apply a Katz analysis. Justice Scalia explicitly asserts that “we do not make trespass the exclusive test. Situations involving merely the transmission of electronic
121
signals without trespass would remain subject to Katz analysis.”
117

118
119
120

121

Warren & Brandeis, supra note 1, at 195. (“Recent inventions and business methods call
attention to the next step which must be taken for the protection of the person, and for
securing . . . the right ‘to be let alone.’”).
City of Ontario v. Quon, 130 S. Ct. 2619, 2629 (2010) (declining to rule on whether one
has a reasonable expectation of privacy in text messages).
Id. (“The judiciary risks error by elaborating too fully on the Fourth Amendment implications of emerging technology before its role in society has become clear.”).
Katz v. United States, 389 U.S. 347, 352–53 (1967) (suggesting that a refusal to protect
telephone communications would “ignore the vital role that the public telephone has
come to play in private communication,” and going on to reject strict trespass analysis as
the sole measure for whether the Fourth Amendment has been violated).
United States v. Jones, 132 S. Ct. 945, 953 (2012) (emphasis omitted).

352

JOURNAL OF CONSTITUTIONAL LAW

[Vol. 15:2

However, his lack of further discussion of this category suggests that
he views such situations as uncommon. As the two concurring opinions underscore, however, transmission of electronic signals without
trespass comprises the vast majority of surveillance methods today.
Therefore, whichever test is applied is flawed. If no physical trespass
occurs, then the trespass approach provides no protection. If no opportunity to demonstrate a privacy expectation exists, then Katz also
fails to protect.
A. Neither the Jones nor Katz Approaches Respond Adequately to This
Reality
The satellite imaging technology exemplifies the shortfall of the
Court’s current approach in defining a search. Without physical
trespass, law enforcement—or anyone else—can attempt to gain information regarding an individual and his personal activities that occur out of public view. It is the fact that anyone can do so that provides the largest challenge to current Fourth Amendment privacy
protections. Because individuals are aware of the power of this technology and its widespread use, many believe they actually have no
privacy. This perception can exist both because of the existence of
such technology, as well as because of its misuse. For example,
Google has apologized for, and admitted to, utilizing a wireless sniffer
122
on its Google Street View vehicles, obtaining data packets of information including user name and passwords, and storing said infor123
mation.
The FCC fined Google for obstructing its investigation of
124
Street View and German officials characterized the data collection
122

123

124

A wireless sniffer is a data collection system that samples, collects, decodes, and analyzes
types of data broadcast through Wi-Fi connections. In re Google Inc. Street View Elec.
Commc’ns Litig., 794 F. Supp. 2d 1067, 1071 (N.D. Cal. 2011) (defining a data sniffer
and noting that Google “issued an apology” and “admitted to intercepting” data through
Street View vehicles); Kevin J. O’Brien & David Streitfeld, Swiss Court Orders Modifications
to Google Street View, N.Y TIMES (June 8, 2012) www.nytimes.com/2012/06/09/
technology/09iht-google09.html (“Google has maintained that the collection of private
information was accidental . . . . [and] was not intended for or used in any Google product.”).
Google, 794 F. Supp. 2d at 1071 (“The wireless sniffer secretly captures data packets . . . [which] must be stored on digital media and then decoded using . . . complicated
technology.”); see also Geissler, supra note 115, at 906 (noting that, in May and October of
2010, Google admitted that its camera-fitted cars had collected data from private, nonpassword protected WiFi networks, and that “entire emails and URLS were captured, as
well as passwords”) (quotation marks omitted) (quoting Creating stronger privacy controls inside Google, GOOGLE OFFICIAL BLOG (Oct. 22, 2010), http://googleblog.blogspot.com/
2010/10/creating-stronger-privacy-controls.html).
O’Brien & Streitfeld, supra note 122 (“[T]he F.C.C. fined Google $25,000, saying it had
obstructed an investigation into Street View.”); David Streitfeld & Kevin J. O’Brien, Google
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as “one of the biggest violations of data protection laws that [they]
125
had ever seen.” While regulators have sought the data collected, no
U.S. regulator has seen it despite efforts by over thirty states’ Attor126
neys General.
In this kind of reality, individuals lose the expectation of privacy under our current jurisprudence.
At first glance, it may appear that these technologies cause no new
Fourth Amendment ramifications because of precedent allowing substantial law enforcement surveillance. The combined caselaw that
permits law enforcement to examine curtilage from navigable air127
128
space; to monitor one’s movements on public thoroughfares; and
to accept information disclosed to third parties (Third Party Doc129
trine) initially suggests that government use of satellite imaging
technology may be without constitutional significance. However, this
argument misses the issue. The issue is not the propriety of law enforcement’s use of satellite imaging technologies (which itself does
raise questions). Rather, the issue is a more fundamental question
regarding the effect of these technologies on the subjective expectation of
privacy. Namely, what happens when the reasonable expectation of
privacy is compromised or diminished not by government “conditioning,” but rather by the inescapable reality of the commercial use of

125
126
127

128

129

Privacy Inquiries Get Little Cooperation, N.Y. TIMES (May 22, 2012), www.nytimes.com/2012
/05/23/technology/google-privacy-inquiries-get-little-cooperation.html (“[The F.C.C.]
tagged Google with a $25,000 fine for obstructing the [Street View data collection] investigation.”).
O’Brien & Streitfeld, supra note 122 (quoting Johannes Caspar, a German data protection official).
Id.
Florida v. Riley, 488 U.S. 445, 450 (1989) (suggesting that law enforcement is “free to inspect the yard from the vantage point of an aircraft flying in the navigable airspace”); see
also California v. Ciraolo, 476 U.S. 207, 215 (1986) (“In an age where private and commercial flight in the public airways is routine, it is unreasonable for respondent to expect
that his marijuana plants were constitutionally protected from being observed with the
naked eye . . . .”).
See United States v. Karo, 468 U.S. 705, 721 (1984) (explaining that, although monitoring
of a beeper—a type of electronic surveillance device—is impermissible while the beeper
is within the confines of a private residence, gathering information from beeper surveillance while the beeper is on public streets is constitutionally permissible under the
Fourth Amendment); United States v. Knotts, 460 U.S. 276, 281 (1983) (“A person traveling in an automobile on public thoroughfares has no reasonable expectation of privacy in
his movements from one place to another.”).
Smith v. Maryland, 442 U.S. 735, 743–44 (1979) (finding that “a person has no legitimate
expectation of privacy in information he voluntarily turns over to third parties”); United
States v. Miller, 425 U.S. 435, 443 (1976) (acknowledging that “the Fourth Amendment
does not prohibit the obtaining of information revealed to a third party and conveyed by
him to Government authorities, even if the information is revealed on the assumption
that it will be used only for a limited purpose and the confidence placed in the third party will not be betrayed”).
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surveillance technology and the commercial or social conditioning
that accompanies it?
One ramification of this conditioning is the evisceration of privacy. It could mean that no individual possesses a subjective expectation of privacy in the curtilage of his or her home. In effect, all yards,
patios, porches, decks, rear driveways, fenced in structures, or plantings—i.e., anything not covered by a roof or thick canopy of trees,
even if completely removed from public view—have become “open
fields,” and therefore searchable. Similarly, the data collected from
individuals online, at times unbeknownst to them, is available for cap130
ture and review. Indeed, in a recent Court of Appeals case regarding Google Street View, Google reportedly argued that, in light of
131
satellite imaging technology, “[c]omplete privacy does not exist.”
Similarly, the CEO of Google rather famously quipped in response to
privacy concerns, “If you have something you don’t want anyone to
132
know, maybe you shouldn’t be doing it in the first place.” These assertions suggest that this lack of privacy holds true even when an individual has no opportunity to demonstrate a subjective expectation
of privacy by opting out of Google Earth or retaining his or her private information.
Furthermore, even if an individual possessed a subjective expectation of privacy, such a claim would likely fail the second prong of Katz
as it is difficult to imagine society would be able to accept such an expectation as objectively reasonable in light of the broad use of this
technology. What is needed today is a reframing of the issue to reflect contemporary reality.

130

131

132

See Updating our privacy policies and terms of service, GOOGLE OFFICIAL BLOG (Jan. 24, 2012),
available at http://googleblog.blogspot.com/2012/01/updating-our-privacy-policies-andterms.html, (describing the cross-sharing of individual information between different
Google products).
Defendant Google Inc.’s Memorandum of Law in Support of its Motion to Dismiss
Amended Complaint at 2, Boring v. Google Inc., 598 F. Supp. 2d 695 (W.D. Pa. 2009)
(No. 08-cv-694) (quoting RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 652D cmt. C (1977)); see also Steven Musil, Google wins Street View privacy suit, CNET NEWS (Feb. 18, 2009), available at news.cnet.com/8301-1023_3-10166532-93.html.
Inside the Mind of Google (CNBC television broadcast Dec. 9, 2009), available at
http://video.cnbc.com/gallery/?video=1409844721&play=1.
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IV. ALTERNATIVE APPROACHES OFFERED BY THE JUSTICES FALL SHORT
IN ADDRESSING TODAY’S DECREASING EXPECTATION OF PRIVACY
A. Justice Harlan’s Balancing Test
Justice Harlan’s balancing approach in White has significant drawbacks in light of commercially-available surveillance. When the subjective expectation of privacy is lost, Justice Harlan would likely abandon the Katz two-prong test and address the issue by asking a
different question: whether it is desirable to allow law enforcement
to utilize these publicly-available technologies. As a threshold matter,
this important value judgment is almost irrelevant because of the
practical considerations. Even if one were to decide that individuals
should not be “saddled” with the ability of law enforcement to utilize
said technologies, how would this be enforced? It is hard to imagine
a workable rule that forbids law enforcement from using Google
Earth but allows others to do so. While such a solution may be workable when addressing a more narrow technology such as wiretapping
or GPS placement on vehicles, many other readily available technologies such as satellite imaging technology are different. This technology is ubiquitous and available through the Internet to anyone
free of charge. Limiting it to non-law enforcement use would be artificial.
More narrowly, the specific prongs of his proposed balancing test
are also inadequate. The first requires an assessment of the “nature
of the practice.” Given the ubiquitous nature of this technology,
there is nothing out of the ordinary when the police use it. Although
highly intrusive, the nature of the government’s use of satellite imaging technology is indistinguishable from private persons’ utilization
of the free Internet program.
The second prong of Justice Harlan’s balancing test would also
fail. It requires an examination of the extent of the impact of law enforcement’s use of technologies on society’s sense of security. The
extent of the impact of satellite imaging technology would be impossible to measure when the complaint is itself that the technology is
readily available to anyone at any time. As such, law enforcement’s
use of it is unlikely to more severely impact one’s sense of security
than the technology itself.
The third prong—the utility of the police action—also provides
little assistance. As with many forms of surveillance, the ability to observe the private property of an individual without alerting said individual has great utility to the law enforcement. Because the first two
prongs are unworkable, they cannot be balanced against a prong that
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will always be in favor of the government. Therefore, Justice Harlan’s
test fails to adequately respond to this twenty-first century problem.
B. Justice Blackmun’s Normative Inquiry
Justice Blackmun’s normative approach in Smith may be a solution
for the problem he envisioned: a deterioration of privacy expectations caused by government “conditioning.” However, when the expectation is lost by all of society being conditioned by commercial entities,
this normative inquiry solution seems unworkable. By definition, if
all of society has lost a subjective expectation of privacy, then a normative approach will be circular, as the normative expectation will
likely duplicate the subjective. This circularity is troubling when that
societal choice “is ‘conditioned’ by influences alien to wellrecognized Fourth Amendment freedoms” from private commercial
entities and social forces. Furthermore, because many of these technologies offer no ability for an individual to demonstrate an expectation of privacy by opting out of this monitoring, a measurement of
what the social norm is or should be is likely impossible.
This normative approach is similar to Amsterdam’s proposed
133
condemnation of an expectations analysis.
Yet, both suffer the
same fate because they fail to acknowledge the relevance of whether a
suspect, claiming privacy in court, sought privacy initially. While
many have criticized the subjective prong of the Katz test, it serves a
purpose. There is a role for understanding whether the defendant
134
thought his actions or items were private.
If the Fourth Amendment protects privacy rights, then the role of the judge is to determine if the government violated a defendant’s privacy rights. Although it is not determinative, a judge is guided in that decision by
determining what the defendant actually considered private. If he
did not consider his actions or the searched location private, it is
135
hard to imagine how his privacy was violated. Accordingly, the subjective expectation, when given a meaningful opportunity to be

133
134

135

See Amsterdam, supra note 37.
Cf. Thomas K. Clancy, United States v. Jones: Fourth Amendment Applicability in the 21st
Century, 10 OHIO ST. J. CRIM. L. (forthcoming Fall 2012) (arguing that to receive Fourth
Amendment protection, one must take steps to exclude the government from accessing
private areas, objects, and data), available at http://papers.ssrn.com/abstract=2097811.
See Orin S. Kerr, Four Models of Fourth Amendment Protection, 60 STAN. L. REV. 503, 508–09
(2007) (suggesting a blend of four models for Fourth Amendment protections, including
the probabilistic model where “a person has a reasonable expectation of privacy when the
odds are very high that others will not successfully pry into his affairs” and “[a]s those
odds drop, the individual’s expectation of privacy becomes less and less reasonable”).
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demonstrated, can serve an important goal of enhancing privacy.
Furthermore, a purely objective approach that “resist[s] captivation
136
in any formula” is intellectually seductive, but in the realm of technology, impractical. In contemporary society, digital divides based on
income, age, and geography lead to different understandings of privacy when it intersects with technology. Therefore, determining a
normative understanding of privacy is impossible.
C. Justice Scalia’s Opinion in Kyllo
Justice Scalia’s approach in Jones, which echoes his opinion in
137
Kyllo, was strongly criticized as applying an eighteenth century solu138
Prior to Kyllo, when faced
tion to a twenty-first century problem.
with an issue involving enhanced technology being used by law enforcement, the Court almost always narrowed the protections of the
139
Fourth Amendment. Justice Scalia, writing for the majority in Kyllo,
140
found the police use of thermal imaging constituted a search. Conspicuously absent from the majority opinion was any endorsement of
141
Katz. Rather, Justice Scalia described the Katz opinion as “circular.”
Justice Scalia based his Kyllo analysis of new technology on two factors: (1) whether the technology ascertained information from a
constitutionally protected area that would normally require a physical
intrusion, and (2) whether the technology was publicly available.
“We think that obtaining by sense-enhancing technology any information regarding the interior of the home that could not otherwise
have been obtained without physical ‘intrusion into a constitutionally

136
137
138

139

140
141

Amsterdam, supra note 37, at 385.
Kyllo v. United States, 533 U.S. 27 (2001).
United States v. Jones, 132 S. Ct. 945, 957–58 (Alito, J., concurring) (“Ironically, the
Court has chosen to decide this case based on [eighteenth] century tort law. By attaching
a small GPS device to the underside of the vehicle that respondent drove, the law enforcement officers in this case engaged in conduct that might have provided grounds in
1791 for a suit for trespass to chattels. And for this reason, the Court concludes, the installation and use of the GPS device constituted a search.” (footnotes omitted)).
Smith v. Maryland, 422 U.S. 735, 742 (1979) (finding that the use of a pen register by a
telephone company does not constitute a “search”); California v. Ciraolo, 476 U.S. 207,
213–14 (1986) (holding that observation of a fenced-in backyard within curtilage of
home from an airplane was not an unreasonable search under the Fourth Amendment);
Dow Chem. Co. v. United States, 476 U.S. 227, 238–39 (1986) (holding that aerial mapping photography of an industrial complex by a government agent was not an unreasonable search).
Kyllo, 533 U.S. at 34–35 (holding that the use of a thermal imaging device from a public
street to detect heat from within a private home constitutes a search).
Id. at 34 (“The Katz test . . . has often been criticized as circular . . . .”).
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protected area’ constitutes a search—at least where (as here) the
142
technology in question is not in general public use.”
However, this approach suffers two fundamental flaws. First,
many modern threats to privacy do not involve physical trespass.
Whether it is satellite imaging technology, triangulating cell phone
143
144
signals,
government-operated video cameras,
or surveillance
145
drones, the police today are able to intrude more and more deeply
into individual’s lives with less actual physical encroachment.
Furthermore, notwithstanding the resurrection of the notion of a
constitutionally protected area, such areas are difficult if not impossible to identify in today’s technology-driven world. Although all
would agree that the home is an area that its occupants consider
146
highly private, technology allows searching of many more areas,
from which a treasure trove of information can be obtained. For example, consider GPS surveillance, which
generates a precise, comprehensive record of a person’s public movements that reflects a wealth of detail about her familial, political, professional, religious, and sexual associations. . . . The Government can store
such records and efficiently mine them for information years into the future. And because GPS monitoring is cheap in comparison to conventional surveillance techniques and, by design, proceeds surreptitiously, it
142
143

144

145

146

Id. (quoting Silverman v. United States, 365 U.S. 505, 512 (1961)).
Triangulation of cell phone signals “is the process of determining the coordinates of a
point based on the known location of two other points. If the direction (but not distance) from each known point to the unknown point can be determined, then a triangle
can be drawn connecting all three points.” In re Application of U.S. for an Order for Prospective Cell Site Location Info. on a Certain Cellular Tel., 460 F. Supp. 2d 448, 451 n.3
(S.D.N.Y. 2006). “Knowledge of the locations of multiple towers receiving signals from a
particular telephone at a given moment permits the determination, by simple mathematics, of the location of the telephone with a fair degree of precision” through triangulation. Id. at 451.
See, e.g., Margaret Harding, Pittsburgh police laud Downtown surveillance cameras, TRIBLIVE
NEWS (Oct. 11, 2012, 12:01 AM), http://triblive.com/news/2753247-74/police-camerassurveillance-video-avenue-downtown-whetsell-camera-charged-detectives#axzz2A3B3I4Sb
(describing a “network of private and public security cameras” used by the Pittsburgh police in the course of investigations); Karen Hopkins, Police Want to Quadruple Surveillance
Cameras at Oceanfront, WVEC.COM (Oct. 16, 2012, 6:21 PM), http://www.wvec.com/mycity/vabeach/Police-want-to-upgrade-expand-surveillance-cams-at-Oceanfront174387091.html (reporting on the Virginia Beach Police Department’s attempts to “install higher tech, digital cameras in trouble spots”).
See generally, STANLEY & CRUMP, supra note 83, at 8–9 (discussing the strong desire by law
enforcement to employ drone aircrafts, and pressure on the Federal Aviation Administration to develop policies to allow such use); Brian Bennett, Police employ Predator drone spy
planes on home front, L.A. TIMES, Dec. 10, 2011, http://articles.latimes.com/print/2011/de
c/10/nation/la-na-drone-arrest-20111211 (discussing the use of U.S. Customs and Border
Protection drones by local police).
But see California v. Carney, 471 U.S. 386, 391 (1985) (finding that a mobile home, even
when used as a home, is a vehicle and therefore has a reduced expectation of privacy).

Nov. 2012]

MISSED OPPORTUNITY

359

evades the ordinary checks that constrain abusive law enforcement prac147
tices . . . .

Similarly, satellite imaging technology observes curtilage, but the
Court has previously held that as long as such images are taken from
legal airspace with no interference in the possessory interest of the
148
property, then no violation occurs.
Second, access to such technology is now readily available to the
general public. Satellite imaging technology is accessible through
free programs such as Google Earth and available to anyone with an
149
Internet connection. GPS devices are available for public purchase.
So much of the technology utilized by law enforcement is indeed
publicly available. Thus, limiting its use on such a basis to civilians
creates a legal fiction that attempts to cabin commonly used technologies as unavailable for government use, while considering the very
150
same action unproblematic when done by a neighbor.
D. Justice Scalia’s Opinion in Jones
The majority opinion in Jones is also not responsive to these new
technological realities. An initial read of the opinion’s assertion that
“the Katz reasonable-expectation-of-privacy test has been added to,
151
not substituted for, the common-law trespassory test,” may incorrectly lead one to conclude that Jones offers increased privacy protection. Perhaps this is so, in the narrow context of GPS tracking. As a
practical matter, however, it adds no protection in the vast majority of
surveillance techniques. While the Court made passing reference to
the government’s “attempt to find something or to obtain infor-

147

148

149

150

151

United States v. Jones, 132 S. Ct. 945, 955–56 (2012) (Sotomayor, J., concurring) (citations omitted) (citing United States v. Pineda-Moreno, 617 F.3d 1120, 1124 (9th. Cir.
2010) (Kozinski, C.J., dissenting)).
See, e.g., Florida v. Riley, 488 U.S. 445, 450 (1989) (noting that where one’s property is
viewable from public airspace, no reasonable expectation to privacy exists); California v.
Ciraolo, 476 U.S. 207, 215 (1986) (“The Fourth Amendment simply does not require the
police traveling in the public airways . . . to obtain a warrant in order to observe what is
visible to the naked eye.”).
273.1 million people in North America are reported as users of the Internet. Internet Usage Statistics for the Americas, INTERNET WORLD STATS, http://www.Internetworldstats.com/
stats2.htm (last visited Sept. 28, 2012).
See Alan Levin, Commercial Drones: A Dogfight at the FAA, BUS. WK. (Feb. 9, 2012),
www.businessweek.com/magazine/commercial-drones-a-dogfight-at-the-faa02092012.html (noting that Federal Aviation Administration rules permit the use of unmanned drone aircraft by hobbyists, and that such drones will soon be “widely available
for sale in the U.S.”).
See Jones, 132 S. Ct. at 952 (emphasis omitted).
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152

mation,” the Court made clear that such activity becomes a search
153
only when it is “conjoined” with a trespass. As mentioned, with satellite imaging technology, online data collection, and other technologies, there is no physical trespass, unlike GPS technology. Thus, as
Justices Alito and Sotomayor point out, the majority’s opinion in Jones
154
does nothing to enhance privacy protections in general. However,
none of the opinions adequately address the effect on the subjective
expectation of privacy.
E. Justice Sotomayor’s Concerns
Of the opinions articulated in Jones, Justice Sotomayor’s is the
most aware of the implications of ubiquitous technology on society’s
expectations. She joined Justice Scalia’s majority opinion. However,
she wrote separately, stating she joined the majority because she
viewed Justice Alito’s approach as perhaps more privacy-limiting. Not
without reason, she then wrote separately, stating:
Justice Alito’s approach, which discounts altogether the constitutional
relevance of the Government’s physical intrusion on Jones’ Jeep, erodes
that longstanding protection for privacy expectations inherent in items
of property that people possess or control. By contrast, the trespassory
test applied in the majority’s opinion reflects an irreducible constitutional minimum: When the Government physically invades personal proper155
ty to gather information, a search occurs.

Justice Sotomayor’s concurrence does, however, find common
ground with some of Justice Alito’s approach. She agrees with Justice
Alito’s “incisive[]” observation that “the same technological advances
that have made possible nontrespassory surveillance techniques will
also affect the Katz test by shaping the evolution of societal privacy
156
expectations.”
Her main concern, however, is the government’s
157
unrestrained ability to collect data.
She recognizes that the Katz
152

153
154

155
156
157

Id. at 951 n.5 (“Likewise with a search. Trespass alone does not qualify, but there must be
conjoined with that what was present here: an attempt to find something or to obtain information.”).
Id.
See id. at 957 (Sotomayor, J., concurring) (questioning the validity of the Third Party Doctrine in today’s technology driven world, as “people reveal a great deal of information
about themselves to third parties in the course of carrying out mundane tasks”); id. at 963
(Alito, J., concurring) (commenting on devices that permit the monitoring of people’s
movements, including closed circuit television, GPS services installed in vehicles and cell
phones, and personal locator technology).
Id. at 955 (Sotomayor, J., concurring) (citation omitted).
Id.
Id. at 955–56 (“In cases involving even short-term monitoring, some unique attributes of
GPS surveillance relevant to the Katz analysis will require particular attention. GPS moni-
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approach may be “ill suited to the digital age, in which people reveal
158
a great deal of information about themselves to third parties.”
More so than Justice Alito, she has a strong appreciation for the effect
of this technology on perceptions of privacy. She then somewhat
narrowly characterizes this effect as implicating the individual’s relationship with his government.
Awareness that the Government may be watching chills associational and
expressive freedoms. And the Government’s unrestrained power to assemble data that reveal private aspects of identity is susceptible to abuse.
The net result is that GPS monitoring—by making available at a relatively
low cost such a substantial quantum of intimate information about any
person whom the Government, in its unfettered discretion, chooses to
track—may “alter the relationship between citizen and government in a
159
way that is inimical to democratic society.”

Justice Sotomayor is alone in discussing these deeper issues. Her
response is almost a hybrid of those offered by both Justice Harlan in
White and Justice Blackmun in Smith. She first seems to suggest that it
is proper to consider societal norms. She then suggests that it is important to follow Justice Harlan’s lead and examine the desirability of
saddling society with such an intrusion by the police without a war160
rant. She next states she “would ask whether people reasonably expect that their movements will be recorded and aggregated in a
manner that enables the Government to ascertain, more or less at
161
will, their political and religious beliefs, sexual habits, and so on.”
It is here that her solution falters. In expanding her discussion to
162
other technologies, she targets the Third Party Doctrine. In so doing she characterizes the problem as a voluntary disclosure to a third
party, as opposed to an involuntary gathering of data by business.
She frames the digital reality of today as one in which information is

158
159
160

161
162

toring generates a precise, comprehensive record of a person’s public movements that reflects a wealth of detail about her familial, political, professional, religious, and sexual associations. . . . The Government can store such records and efficiently mine them for information years into the future.” (citing United States v. Pineda-Moreno, 617 F.3d 1120,
1124 (9th Cir. 2010) (Kozinski, C.J., dissenting))).
Jones, 132 S. Ct. at 957 (Sotomayor, J., concurring).
Id. at 956 (quoting United States v. Cuevas-Perez, 640 F.3d 272, 285 (7th Cir. 2011)
(Flaum, J., concurring)).
Jones, 132 S. Ct. at 956 (“I would also consider the appropriateness of entrusting to the
Executive, in the absence of any oversight from a coordinate branch, a tool so amenable
to misuse, especially in light of the Fourth Amendment’s goal to curb arbitrary exercises
of police power to and prevent ‘a too permeating police surveillance.’” (quoting United
States v. Di Re, 332 U.S. 581, 595 (1948))).
Jones, 132 S. Ct. at 956.
Id. at 957 (arguing that it should not invalidate Fourth Amendment privacy protections
when information is “voluntarily disclosed” to third parties).
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“voluntarily disclosed” by the public for a limited purpose and concludes that such information should not be “disentitled to Fourth
163
In doing so, she seems to join Justice
Amendment protection.”
Alito in framing the issue as a “‘tradeoff’ of privacy for conven164
ience.”
In the satellite imaging technology context, as well as with many
other technologies, people do not themselves voluntarily disclose any
such information to the public. They never make the choice to participate in such technology. They never have the opportunity to
make such a “tradeoff” of losing privacy in exchange for other social
gains. To the contrary, even their consent is never obtained. In fact,
at times, companies such as Google have actively circumvented the
“third party cookie blocking” privacy feature of web browsers to ob165
tain information without users’ knowledge.
Therefore, Justice Sotomayor’s solution of abandoning the Third Party Doctrine offers only a partial accounting for this problem. While it may address
scenarios where the information is exchanged voluntarily, it does
nothing when the information is obtained unbeknownst to the individual.
D. Justice Alito’s Retention of a Compromised Katz
Justice Alito asserts plainly that Katz avoids the problems of the
166
Scalia approach.
For the reasons previously discussed in Part I.B,
this two-pronged approach is flawed in the context of some of these
technologies. Therefore, this assertion that a properly applied Katz
analysis avoids problems is not without weakness. Even Justice Alito is
163
164
165

166

Id.
Id. (quoting Jones, 132 S. Ct. at 962 (Alito, J., concurring)).
Jonathan Mayer, SafariTrackers, WEB POLICY (Feb. 17, 2012), http://webpolicy.org/2012
/02/17/safari-trackers/ (analyzing the Internet browser Safari’s “cookie blocking” feature, and efforts by companies like Google and Vibrant to circumvent Internet browser
privacy settings); see also Defendant Google Inc.’s Memorandum of Law in Support of its
Motion to Dismiss Amended Complaint at 1, Boring v. Google, Inc., 598 F. Supp. 2d 695
(W.D. Pa. 2009) (defending Google’s practice of taking pictures of private homes for its
Internet “Street View” feature); Google’s Circumvention of Browser Privacy Settings, EPIC,
http://epic.org/privacy/google/tracking/googles_circumvention_of_brows.html
(last
visited Sept. 28, 2012) (reporting on Google’s efforts to circumvent Internet privacy safeguards in order to target advertising more specifically); Steven Musil, Google wins Street
View Privacy Suit, CNET NEWS (Feb. 18, 2009), http://news.cnet.com/8301-1023_310166532-93.html (reporting Google’s successful legal defense of its “Street View” process
of taking pictures of private homes against a reasonable expectation of privacy challenge).
Jones, 132 S. Ct. at 962 (Alito, J., concurring) (“The Katz expectation-of-privacy test avoids
the problems and complications noted above . . . .”).
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forced to acknowledge some weakness in the Katz approach.
recognizes that

363
167

He

[T]he Katz test rests on the assumption that this hypothetical reasonable
person has a well-developed and stable set of privacy expectations. But
technology can change those expectations. Dramatic technological
change may lead to periods in which popular expectations are in flux
and may ultimately produce significant changes in popular attitudes.
New technology may provide increased convenience or security at the
168
expense of privacy, and many people may find the tradeoff worthwhile.

Again, here Justice Alito assumes there is a “tradeoff.” How that can
be assumed is questionable in the context of satellite imaging technology or other data collection mechanisms that do not allow for user
notice or consent. In many instances, a tradeoff can be assumed if
there is an opportunity to demonstrate an expectation of privacy and
but the individual chooses not to take that opportunity. For example,
the decision to participate in social networking, even on a limited basis with a small network of contacts, brings with it some collection of
169
data by companies such as Facebook.
However, it may not bring
with it an agreement to be tracked by third parties. With the Library
170
of Congress archiving all public tweets, the decision to engage in
Twitter involves trading off some privacy. But increasingly, individuals are having private data taken from them and assuming there is
nothing they can do. For these reasons, Justice Alito correctly de171
mands a legislative solution.
V. NEW PROPOSAL: OWNERSHIP OF DIGITAL FOOTPRINTS AND OPT-IN
PROVISION TO SHARE SUCH DATA
While these alternative approaches may be viable in certain circumstances, they are inadequate for this contemporary problem of a
loss of a Katz subjective expectation of privacy due to commercial
conditioning. On one end of the spectrum of solutions is to do nothing. Justice Alito’s reluctant application of Katz would result in no
167
168
169

170

171

Id. (acknowledging that the Katz test “is not without its own difficulties”).
Id.
See Juan Carlos Perez, Facebook Admits Ad Service Tracks Logged-Off Users, PCWORLD (Dec. 3,
2007, 12:00 PM), http://www.pcworld.com/article/140225/article.html (reporting that
Facebook admitted to allowing an ad service to track its users activities even while loggedoff from the site).
News Releases: Twitter Donates Entire Tweet Archive to Library of Congress, LIBRARY OF
CONGRESS (Apr. 15, 2010), http://www.loc.gov/today/pr/2010/10-081.html (announcing Twitter’s agreement to donate its digital archive of public tweets to the Library of
Congress).
See Jones, 132 S. Ct. at 964 (Alito, J., concurring) (“In circumstances involving dramatic
technological change, the best solution to privacy concerns may be legislative.”).
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expectation of privacy, even in data exposed to the public without
express consent of the individual. In the satellite imaging context,
172
this would mean the curtilage of the home. This rather draconian
result provides clarity and may support an originalist view of the
Amendment as protective of the interior of the home. However, this
severe limitation on Fourth Amendment protections, caused by
commercial activity, fails to satisfy. There is something fundamental
about Brandeis’s “right to be left alone.” That right is honored when
society decides that an individual loses said right when he demonstrates a willingness to sacrifice it. Ruling that one loses this central
right when a commercial entity takes it with impunity affronts this
core value.
The other extreme would be a new constitutional test for a government search. Just as the technology of the telephone drove the
opinion in Katz, so too could the technological development of satellite imaging or other similar technologies drive a new approach.
However, tying a new test for reasonableness to technological advances is always problematic, as the effectiveness of the new approach
is likely outdated before the ink outlining said test is dry. While this
may have been more manageable in 1967, today’s technology is
changing so rapidly that the ability of the law to respond with the
needed alacrity is questionable. Indeed, the Court noted as much in
2010, cautioning that “[t]he judiciary risks error by elaborating too
fully on the Fourth Amendment implications of emerging technology
173
before its role in society has become clear.”
A. Functionality
The most viable and less extreme solution is a statutory one. Justice Alito comes the closest to recognizing this as a required solution.
He concedes that some privacy losses are not the product of value
tradeoff, but rather of a situation in which “the public does not welcome the diminution of privacy that new technology entails,
[though] they may eventually reconcile themselves to this develop174
ment as inevitable.” Justice Alito urges Congress to act, as it is “well
situated to gauge changing public attitudes, to draw detailed lines,
172

173
174

Although Justice Scalia obtained five votes for his approach in Jones, this arguably does
not affect the proposed scenario by supplanting Justice Alito’s model. As Justice Scalia
concedes, with data intrusions there is often no physical trespass, so Katz would apply.
Jones, 132 S. Ct. at 953 (“Situations involving merely the transmission of electronic signals
without trespass would remain subject to Katz analysis.”).
City of Ontario v. Quon, 130 S. Ct. 2619, 2629 (2010).
Jones, 132 S. Ct. at 962 (Alito, J., concurring) (footnote omitted).
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and to balance privacy and public safety in a comprehensive way.”
Although such a statutory approach is plagued by the same problem
as a new Fourth Amendment test—the rapid pace of changing technology—it should not target the technology. Any such approach
should be a functional one and not a technological one.
Functionally, the actual problem is commercial conditioning. It is
here where the Court has failed to correctly identify the issue and
thus the solution. Justice Sotomayor describes an individual’s data
that has been exposed to and assembled by the government as “voluntarily disclosed to some member of the public for a limited pur176
pose . . . .” Justice Alito frames the issues as a “tradeoff” which also
177
suggests a voluntary choice. However, in the satellite imaging technology model and others, the disclosure of information is not voluntary, as the individual has been afforded no opportunity to refuse.
This is where Congress must focus.
The problem is really who owns a person’s “digital dossier” or “digital identity.” Professor Solove coined the term “digital dossier,” noting that it includes information about individuals compiled by “companies [they] have never established any contact with,” through
which others “can glean information relating to [a person’s] financial
transactions, debts, creditors, and checking accounts[,] . . . . race, income, opinions, political beliefs, health, lifestyle, and purchasing
habits[,] . . . . supermarket purchases, . . . . inventory of one’s groceries, over-the-counter medications, hygiene supplies, and contracep178
tive devices,” among other things. Palfrey and Glasser describe it as
all the personally identifiable digital information associated with
one’s name, and they further discuss one’s digital identity as a subset
of information “composed of all those data elements that are disclosed online to third parties, whether it is by [one’s] choice or
179
not.” Our current system of Fourth Amendment protection seems
to accept that the “digital dossier” or “digital identity” of an individual is considered abandoned when possessed by a third party. Current
law does not take into account how a third party collects that data or
175
176
177
178

179

Id. at 964.
Id. at 957 (Sotomayor, J., concurring).
Id. at 962 (Alito, J., concurring).
Daniel J. Solove, Digital Dossiers and the Dissipation of Fourth Amendment Privacy, 75 S. CAL. L.
REV. 1083, 1092 (2002); see also id. at 1095 (describing digital dossiers as “digital biographies, a horde of aggregated bits of information combined to reveal a portrait of who
we are based upon what we buy, the organizations we belong to, how we navigate the Internet, and which shows and videos we watch”).
JOHN PALFREY & URS GASSER, BORN DIGITAL: UNDERSTANDING THE FIRST GENERATION OF
DIGITAL NATIVES 40 (2008).
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that often the individual had no meaningful opportunity to consent to
either the initial collection of that data or the subsequent sharing of
180
it. A legislative solution must focus on this problem.
Such legislation should focus on commercial services that collect
information from digital dossiers and expose it to the public or other
third parties. In the satellite imaging context, this would mean companies that visually expose concealed private property. In the search
engine world it includes companies that record information about
181
users and share it with advertisers.
Such businesses should not be
allowed to condition individuals that this information exposure will
just happen, so any expectation of privacy is lost. Rather, the law
should require a meaningful “opt-in” provision prior to making the
information publicly available. Congress must enact legislation that
precludes publication of private data, including images of private
property, when the individual does not opt in to such disclosure.
B. Precedence
While this may at first appear unprecedented, there is a rich history of such a response. Justice Alito most recently called for a legislative response to these inexpensive and intrusive technological abili182
ties.
Historic precedent supports this approach. After Smith, Congress
enacted laws that effectively required procedural review prior to mon180

181

182

For example, Austrian law student Max Schrems has spearheaded a movement to disclose
the amount of information Facebook collects from its users. See Kashmir Hill, Max
Schrems: The Austrian Thorn in Facebook’s Side, FORBES (Feb. 7, 2012, 10:03 AM),
http://www.forbes.com/sites/kashmirhill/2012/02/07/the-austrian-thorn-in-facebooksside/. Using a provision in European privacy law referred to as the “right to access,”
Schrems requested that Facebook disclose the dossier collected on him. Id. He received
over 1200 pages of information that he was unaware Facebook had been collecting, incuding: e-mail addresses he never provided, deleted messages, records of who else signed
on to Facebook from his computer, etc. Id.
Cecilia Kang, Google announces privacy changes across products; users can’t opt out, WASH. POST
(Jan. 24, 2012), http://www.washingtonpost.com/business/economy/google-tracksconsumers-across-products-users-cant-opt-out/2012/01/24/gIQArgJHOQ_story.html
(describing Google’s plan to integrate data collected across its sites, including its search
engine, YouTube, and Gmail, ostensibly to allow Google to “better tailor its ads to people’s tastes”); Hiawatha Bray, Google policy brings privacy worry, THE BOSTON GLOBE (Feb.
24, 2012), http://www.bostonglobe.com/business/2012/02/24/critics-google-changesthreaten-privacy/xIpso7CMd143KjvlC7FyqN/story.html?camp=pm (reporting on the
changes to Google’s privacy policies that will allow information gathered about users of
any one of its products, including its Android operating system on smartphones, to be
shared across other Google platforms in order to “deliver more accurate search results
and advertising that is more relevant to individual customers”).
See Jones, 132 S. Ct. at 964 (Alito, J., concurring).
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183

itoring dialed phone numbers.
Congress, through Title III of the
Electronic Communication Privacy Act, drafted provisions governing
the use of pen registers, including imposition of a requirement that
government officials first certify before an authorized magistrate that
“the information likely to be obtained is relevant to an ongoing crim184
inal investigation.”
The Children’s Online Privacy Protection Act
(“COPPA”) forbids the collection of personal information from a
child by website operators unless they obtain verifiable parental con185
sent. In other words, parents must opt in to that disclosure. More
recently, the federal implementation of a “Do Not Call List” provides
186
firmer ground for such a solution. Such legislation and rules forbid
direct automatic dialing systems contacting any cellular phone or
187
phone that would be charged.
Similarly it forbids telemarketing
188
Such legislation and
phone calls without prior consent of party.
regulations balance consumer protection with commercial interests.
Although an opt-out approach, this legislation supplies precedence
for the proposed governmental regulation.
There is compelling support, not just historical precedent, for
such an approach both abroad and more recently domestically. The
strongest support for this legislative solution comes from overseas.
While here in the United States, the Court has seemingly thrown up
its hands at the reality of the collection of personal data and its impli189
cations for privacy, Europeans have taken a different position. Eu183

184
185
186
187
188
189

Electronic Communications Privacy Act of 1986, 18 U.S.C. § 3122 (2006) (describing
procedures for applications to the courts by government lawyers for the installation and
use of pen registers or trap and trace devices).
18 U.S.C. §§ 3122(a)(2), 3122(b)(2) (2006).
15 U.S.C. § 6502 (2006).
15 U.S.C. § 6151 (2006).
47 C.F.R. § 64.1200(a)(iii) (2011).
47 C.F.R. § 64.1200(a)(2) (2011).
An example of European resistance to privacy intrusion is reflected in its response to
Google Street View technology. Some European countries disallowed the collection of
data pending an investigation; in other nations, the individuals physically blocked roads
to keep the vehicles from gathering information. See Geissler, supra note 115, at 899. Still
others fined Google. Id. at 917. Google has been fined by the FCC, sanctioned in France
and Switzerland, banned from collecting images in Greece, and suspended in Austria and
the Czech Republic. Court rules in favour of Google Street View, SWISSINFO.CH (June 8, 2012,
1:41 PM), http://www.swissinfo.ch/eng/swiss_news/Court_rules_in_favour_of_Google_S
treet_View.html?cid=32861794 (reporting on the ruling of a Swiss Federal Court requiring Google to implement blurring of faces and car license plates with an accessible process for requests to be filed without red tape, and commenting that in Austria and the
Czech Republic, Google Maps Street View has been suspended since 2010); Geissler, supra note 115, at 899, 917 (noting that Greece and the Czech Republic forbade Google
from taking additional images while those countries investigated possible privacy violations, and that France fined Google 100,000 euros for improperly collecting personal da-
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ropeans have combated the invasion of privacy not by precluding its
190
disclosure, but by increasing individual control over the data.
The Charter for Fundamental Rights of the European Union affords privacy protection a hallowed place, fundamental to the freedoms inherent in being human.
Article Eight provides that
“[e]veryone has the right to the protection of personal data concern191
ing him or her.” This includes the right to have the data processed
“fairly for specified purposes and on the basis of the consent of the
192
person concerned or some other legitimate basis laid down by law.”
193
It further includes the right of access to any data collected.
Since
1995, the main European Union legislation in this area has been the
Data Protection Directive, Directive 95/46/EC, which regulates the
194
processing of personal data.
Personal data includes “any information relating to an individual, whether it relates to his or her pri195
vate, professional or public life.” However, the European Commission recognized the limits of this directive due to the reality that
“[t]echnological progress and globalisation have profoundly changed
the way our data is collected” as well as that each European Union
196
member state implemented it with different rules and regulations.

190

191

192
193
194

195

196

ta); Hayley Tsukayama, Google fined by FCC for impeding Street View probe, WASH. POST (Apr.
16, 2012), http://www.washingtonpost.com/business/technology/google-fined-by-fcc-forimpeding-street-view-probe/2012/04/16/gIQAePySLT_story.html (describing the FCC’s
decision to fine Google $25,000 for obstructing the Commission’s investigation by not responding to requests for material information or provide certifications or verifircations of
its responses). Most of the forty countries in which the application is available have expressed concern over Street View. Court rules in favour of Google Street View, supra.
Court rules in favour of Google Street View, supra note 189 (explaining recent decision by
Swiss Federal Administrative Court requiring Google Street View to attend to all requests
by individuals to have their images blurred and anonymity protected).
Charter of Fundamental Rights of the European Union, art. 8(1), 2000 O.J. (C 364) 10.
This concept of digital protection has been said to be linked to privacy as a “personality
right, . . . predicated on dignity.” Karen Eltis, Breaking Through the “Tower of Babel”: A
“Right to be Forgotten” and How Trans-Systemic Thinking Can Help Re-Conceptualize Privacy
Harm in the Age of Analytics, 22 FORDHAM INTELL. PROP. MEDIA & ENT. L.J. 69, 93 (2011).
Such an idea also harkens back to Brandeis and Warren’s description of privacy as a principle of “inviolate personality.” Warren & Brandeis, supra note 1, at 211.
Charter of Fundamental Rights of the European Union, supra note 191, at art. 8(2).
Id.
Directive 95/46/EC of the European Parliament and the Council of 24 October 1995 on
the protection of individuals with regard to the processing of personal data and on the
free movement of such data, 1995 O.J. (L 281) 31, available at
http://ec.europa.eu/justice/policies/privacy/docs/95-46-ce/dir1995-46_part1_en.pdf.
Press Release, European Commission, Data Protection Reform: Frequently asked questions at 1 (Jan. 25, 2012), available at http://europa.eu/rapid/pressReleasesAction.do?ref
erence=MEMO/12/41&format=PDF&aged=1&language=EN&guiLanguage=en.
Press Release, European Comission, Commission proposes a comprehensive reform of
data protection rules to increase users’ control of their data and to cut costs for business-
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Consequently, on January 25, 2012 the European Commission introduced several proposed reforms to its 1995 Data Protection Di197
The reforms relevant to this Article focus not on governrective.
ment use of data, but further upstream on both data collection and
the use of data once collected. The touchstone for this approach is
not a nebulous concept of privacy; rather, its framework is more akin
to assessing the right of the individual to own his own data, and the
corresponding lack of a right of commercial entities to take data
without consequences. It is an extension of the “right of personali198
ty.”
The proposal is part of a three-fold regime. The first allows a min199
The second demands that
imum amount of data to be collected.
200
privacy-enhancing default settings be the norm.
This is known as
201
The third involves a concept of “data protec“privacy by default.”
202
tion by design.”
A hallmark of this is the concept of the individual’s apparent right to continuous control over one’s own information.
For example, this includes the requirement of a data subject’s con203
sent to processing of information. Notably, this consent necessarily
would seem to be more than an agreement to a “terms of use” docu-

197
198

199

200

201

202

203

es (Jan. 25, 2012), available at http://europa.eu/rapid/pressReleasesAction.do?reference
=IP/12/46&format=PDF&aged=1&language=EN&guiLanguage=en.
See id.
Rolf H. Weber, The Right to Be Forgotten: More than a Pandora’s Box?, 2 JIPITEC 120, 121
(2011), available at http://www.jipitec.eu/issues/jipitec-2-2-2011/3084/jipitec%202%20%20a%20-%20weber.pdf (explaining that the European concept of “the right to be forgotten can be considered as contained in the right of the personality [sic], encompassing
several elements such as dignity, honor, and the right to private life”).
Commission Proposal for a Regulation of the European Parliament and of the Council on the protection of individuals with regard to the processing of personal data and on the free movement of such
data, at 43–44, COM (2012) 11 final (Jan. 25, 2012), available at http://ec.europa.eu/
justice/data-protection/document/review2012/com_2012_11_en.pdf (Articles 5 and 6).
European Commission, How does the data protection reform strengthen citizens’ rights?,
http://ec.europa.eu/justice/data-protection/document/review2012/
factsheets/2_en.pdf (last visited Oct. 22, 2012) (explaining “privacy by design” and “privacy by default” as principles that require that “data protection safeguards should be built
into products and services from the earliest stage of development, and that privacyfriendly default settings should be the norm”).
Press Release, European Commission, Security industry: Commission proposes Action
Plan to enable growth—further details (July 30, 2012), available at
http://europa.eu/rapid/pressReleasesAction.do?reference=MEMO/12/605&format=PD
F&aged=0&language=EN&guiLanguage=en; Commission Proposal for a Regulation of the European Parliament and of the Council on the protection of individuals with regard to the processing
of personal data and on the free movement of such data, supra note 199, at 56 (Article 23).
Commission Proposal for a Regulation of the European Parilament and of the Council on the protection of Individuals with regard to the processing of personal data and on the free movement of such
data, supra note 199, at 56 (Article 23).
Id. at 43–44 (Articles 5 and 6).
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ment. Such “terms of use” agreements do little to effectively inform
the consumer of her rights due to their length and complicated language. Additionally, they also hold the individual hostage by precluding the use of the service if he does not agree to the privacy infringements. The reforms address this by stating that “[c]onsent shall
not provide a legal basis for the processing, where there is a significant imbalance between the position of the data subject and the con204
troller.”
Further, the individual does not lose his rights to his information once consent is given. Rather, he has the right to withdraw
205
consent at any time. Even after made public, the individual retains
206
a “right to be forgotten and to erasure.” This allows individuals the
right to request their data be deleted and compels the Internet service provider to completely delete all personal data belonging to an
207
individual and communicate that request to third parties.
The
rights of individuals include rights to transparent information, to information about and access to data collected, as well as rectification,
208
and erasure.
More recently, the federal government has also moved closer to
conceptualizing the need for more individual control over one’s personal data. In February 2012, the White House announced the
Framework for Protecting Privacy and Promoting Innovation In the Global
209
Digital Economy. Here, the White House recognized that “additional
210
This framework contains a
[privacy] protections are necessary.”
“Consumer Privacy Bill of Rights” that states: “Consumers have a
right to exercise control over what personal data companies collect
211
from them and how they use it.” Additionally, the Bill of Rights includes the “right to expect that companies will collect, use, and dis204
205
206
207
208

209

210

211

Id. at 45 (Article 7).
Id.
Id. at 51 (Article 17).
Id.; European Commission, supra note 200.
Commission Proposal for a Directive of the European Parliament and of the Council on the protection
of individuals with regard to the processing of personal data by competent authorities for the purposes
of prevention, investigation, detection, or prosecution of criminal offences or the execution of criminal
penalties, and the free movement of such data at 8, COM (2012) 10 final (Jan. 25, 2012), available at http://eur-lex.europa.eu/LexUriServ/LexUriServ.do?uri=COM:2012:0010:FIN
:EN:PDF (stating the rights of the data subject).
Press Release, The White House, We Can’t Wait: Obama Administration Unveils Blueprint for a “Privacy Bill of Rights” to Protect Consumers Online (Feb. 23, 2012), available
at http://www.whitehouse.gov/the-press-office/2012/02/23/we-can-t-wait-obamaadministration-unveils-blueprint-privacy-bill-rights.
THE WHITE HOUSE, CONSUMER DATA PRIVACY IN A NETWORKED WORLD: A FRAMEWORK
FOR PROTECTING PRIVACY AND PROMOTING INNOVATION IN THE GLOBAL DIGITAL ECONOMY
1 (2012), available at http://www.whitehouse.gov/sites/default/files/privacy-final.pdf.
Id. at 47 (delineating the “Consumer Privacy Bill of Rights”).
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close personal data in ways that are consistent with the context in
212
which consumers provide the data.”
This proposal is a move in the right direction; however, it falls
short. For example, the White House proposal directs the Commerce
Department’s National Telecommunications and Information Administration (“NTIA”) to develop the implementation of these rights.
Unlike the European approach, the White House approach appears
to intend a voluntary system for those affected companies. In its request for comment, the NTIA discussed “encouraging” companies to
develop voluntary codes of conduct that would only be legally en213
forced if participants commit to them and then fail to comply.
214
However, voluntary regimes have not been successful. For example,
Google and other such companies change privacy policies with impunity to decrease the amount of protection provided by privacy
terms from what it was when customers first signed on with the com215
pany.
Recently, the Europeans also warned Google that the new

212
213
214

215

Id.
Multistakeholder Process to Develop Consumer Data Privacy Codes of Conduct, 77 Fed.
Reg. 43, 13098 (Mar. 5, 2012).
For example, Google had voluntarily agreed to a consent order in October 2011, following an FTC investigation. Elec. Privacy Info. Ctr. v. F.T.C., 844 F. Supp. 2d 98, 100
(D.D.C. 2012), aff’d, 2012 WL 1155661 (D.C. Cir. Mar. 5, 2012). Three months later,
Google announced that it would change its privacy policy to allow much increased tracking of information, leading to the Electronic Privacy Information Center (“EPIC”) filing a
lawsuit that such action is in a violation of an October 2011 consent order in a previous
lawsuit. Id. (“Google announced in January 2012 that it would implement changes to its
user privacy policies for all of its services. EPIC contends that this intended policy
change, which is scheduled to take effect on March 1, 2012, will violate the Consent Order. Although EPIC is not a party to the Consent Order, it filed a motion for temporary
restraining order and preliminary injunction on the grounds that the FTC has a ‘mandatory, nondiscretionary duty’ to enforce it.”); see also EPIC v. FTC (Enforcement of the Google
Consent Order), EPIC, http://epic.org/privacy/ftc/google/consent-order.html (last visited
Oct. 30, 2012) (summarizing the background and news surrounding EPIC’s lawsuit to enforce the Google consent order, as well as giving an overview of the legal proceedings);
Somini Sengupta, Consumer Rights Groups Says Google Broke Its Promise, N.Y. TIMES BITS
BLOG (Feb. 8, 2012, 8:45 PM), http://bits.blogs.nytimes.com/2012/02/08/consumerrights-group-says-google-broke-its-promise/ (reporting on the respective positions of
EPIC and Google on the litigation surrounding the potential violation of Google’s consent order with the FTC by Google’s announced data collection changes).
See John P. Mello Jr., Facebook Changes Privacy Policy Again, PC WORLD (Mar. 21, 2012,
11:17 AM), http://www.pcworld.com/article/252289/facebook_changes_privacy_policy_
again.html (reporting on Facebook’s decision to eliminate its “privacy policy” in favor of a
“data-use policy” that allows more extensive collection and use of data by the company,
and going on to note that users agree to the statement “simply by using Facebook” (quoting Sarah A. Downey, a Boston-area online privacy attorney)); Kang, supra note 181 (describing the plight of a Gmail user who “might never have imagined that the content of
his or her [e-mail] messages could affect the experience on seemingly unrelated Web
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policy “does not meet the requirements of the European Directive on
216
Data Protection,” but to no avail.
Additionally, the White House proposal is lacking specifics. As a
technical matter, commercial entities could claim that today’s users
are given a choice not to be tracked that is arguably consistent with
these vague White House concepts. But the choice is false. Consent
must be meaningful for it to be a legitimate protection of privacy. It
currently is not meaningful. Consent is not voluntary if obtained
through a coercive or imbalanced terms of service agreement. By
placing the consent provisions in such an agreement, use of the service is conditional on the “consent.” That is hardly a voluntary consent; it seems more akin to coercion. Embedding consent in the
terms of service is simply not a viable option for privacy protection if
individuals cannot avail themselves of the service if they do not consent to the terms. While that may be appropriate for optional preferences, such as consenting to Internet service providers disclosing information when lawfully subpoenaed, it is not reasonable to demand
consent to sell personal information to unknown third parties for
profit in exchange for a needed service. For consent to be legitimate,
it must be a result of an opt-in structure.
The concept of an opt-in provision has some support in the United States Congress. “Do Not Track” bills have been proposed in both
217
the House and Senate. The Do Not Track Me Online Act proposed
to have the Federal Trade Commission promulgate rules for an
“online opt-out mechanism” to allow consumers to effectively and
218
easily prohibit the collection or use of “covered information.”
However, it applied to limited entities whose primary business is collecting such information, covered only limited information, and car219
ried an insignificant penalty. Such a narrow focus does nothing to
prevent the dissemination of one’s image or images of items or prop-

216

217

218
219

sites such as YouTube” as an illustrative example of the potential privacy consequences of
Google’s decision to integrate data collected across its different services).
Letter from Isabelle Falque-Pierrotin, President, Commission Nationale de
l’Informatique et des Libertés, to Larry Page, CEO, Google Inc. (Feb. 27, 2012), available
at
http://ec.europa.eu/justice/data-protection/article-29/documentation/otherdocument/files/2012/20120227_letter_cnil_google_privacy_policy_en.pdf.
For the House of Representatives bill, see Do Not Track Me Online Act, H.R. 654, 112th
Cong. (2011). A similar bill was also introduced in the Senate. Do-Not-Track Online Act
of 2011, S. 913, 112th Cong. (2011). A narrower third bill targeting the prevention of
tracking of information regarding minor children was also proposed. See Do Not Track
Kids Act of 2011, H.R. 1895, 112th Cong. (2011).
Do Not Track Me Online Act, H.R. 654, 112th Cong. § 3(a) (2011).
Id. at §§ 2(2), 2(3), 5(b).
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220

erty that one has attempted to keep private.
The Senate version,
the Do Not Track Online Act of 2011, is perhaps even weaker. It authorizes the Federal Trade Commission to promote regulations that
allow individuals to indicate “whether [they] prefer to have personal
221
information collected . . . .” Even current coercive terms of service
agreements would seem to comply with this vague proposal. Moreover, it seems to cover only the initial collection of information, and
not subsequent use.
An opt-in system also appears to be technically possible. For example, in the context of satellite imaging, Google has the capability
222
of obscuring images.
Google Earth and Google Street View have
voluntarily complied with requests from governments to blur images
for security reasons. These include blurring the entire city of North
Oaks, Minnesota, whose roads are private, as well as locations such as
governmental residences, military locations, research facilities, and
223
energy sources which could be the target of a terrorist attack.
In
Germany, Google will blur a resident’s building at his request and
224
over 244,000 Germans have requested such. The Swiss Federal Supreme Court, in reversing an order requiring automatic removal of
all Google Street View images, did require that 99% percent of the
images be anonymized and that Google anonymize the remaining
225
images upon request in an “efficient and unbureaucratic manner.”
The court did require complete blurring of images of persons and

220
221
222

223

224

225

See Geissler, supra note 115, at 915.
Do-Not-Track Online Act of 2011, S. 913, 112th Cong. § 2(a)(1) (2011).
See, e.g., Kelly Hearn, Terrorist Use of Google Earth Raises Security Fears, NAT’L GEOGRAPHIC
(Mar. 12, 2007), http://news.nationalgeographic.com/news/2007/03/070312-googlecensor.html (reporting that Google replaced detailed images of British military bases with
pre-Iraq war data).
Lora Pabst, North Oaks tells Google Maps: Keep Out—we mean it, STARTRIBUNE (May 31,
2008) www.startribune.com/lifestyle/19416279.html (reporting on Google’s compliance
with the unanimous request of the citizens of North Oaks, in which roads are privately
owned by residents, to be removed from Google Maps); see also IT Security Editors,
Blurred Out:
51 Things You Aren’t Allowed to See on Google Maps, IT SEC.,
http://www.itsecurity.com/features/51-things-not-on-google-maps-071508/.
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vehicle number plates prior to publication. This ruling will require
Google to lower its cameras to prevent viewing over walls and hedges
because the ruling forbids publication of images not visible by pass227
ersby. After public outcry, Google Maps Street View agreed to blur
228
depictions of people and license plates in its images. Furthermore,
several Internet companies have expressed support for weak regula229
tions and have not raised technical objections, thus implying the
regulations are technically possible.
The debate within the industry has focused not on infeasibility,
but on definitions. In 2012, the World Wide Web Consortium, an international organization dedicated to the long-term growth of the
230
web, convened a Working Group on Tracking Protection.
The
purpose of their group was to develop standards for a “Do Not Track”
policy to protect personal privacy, which allows one to use a one-click
browser setting to set up an HTTP header that will tell websites one
231
does not want to be tracked. This discussion focused on definitions
232
and challenges, and distinguished itself from industry-only efforts.
Interestingly, according to the privacy organization Electronic Frontier Foundation, the objection to this “Do Not Track” policy comes
from online advertising organizations, who claim it will destroy their
233
profits. In contrast, Microsoft has announced its next version of In226

227

228

229

230

231
232
233

Press Release, Swiss Federal Supreme Court, Data protection matters in the context of
Google Street View: Federal Supreme Court partially upholds Google’s appeal (June 8,
2012), available at http://www.bger.ch/mm_1c_230_2011_d.pdf.
O’Brien & Streitfeld, supra note 122; Google Partially Wins in Swiss Street View Privacy Row,
LAW360 (June 8, 2012), http://www.law360.com/privacy/articles/348310/googlepartially-wins-in-swiss-street-view-privacy-row (reporting on the limitations imposed on
Google by the highest Swiss court).
Elinor Mills, Google now zaps faces, license plates on Map Street View, CNET (Aug. 22, 2007,
2:02 PM), http://News.cnet.com/8301-10784_3-9764512-7.html#! (explaining that “partly
in response to criticism,” Google has changed its privacy policies so that “anyone can alert
the company and have an image of a license plate or a recognizable face removed”).
Julia Angwin, Web Firms to Adopt ‘No Track’ Button, WALL ST. J., Feb. 23, 2012, at B1 (reporting on the decision of a “coalition of Internet giants” to support the adoption of notracking buttons).
Rainey Reitman, April 2012, the State of Do Not Track: Lead Up to Tracking Protecting Working
Group Negotiations in Washington, DC, ELEC. FRONTIER FOUND. (Apr. 5, 2012),
https://www.eff.org/deeplinks/2012/04/april-2012-state-do-not-track-lead-trackingprotecting-working-group-negotiations (providing an overview of the World Wide Web
Consortium Tracking Protection Working Group meeting).
Id.
Id.
Id. (describing the Interactive Advertising Bureau’s annual leadership meeting in which
President and CEO Randall Rothenberg criticized the efforts of those working for Do Not
Track, stating it had the potential to destroy their business); see also Peter Eckersley, Will
Industry Agree to a Meaningful Do Not Track?, ELEC. FRONTIER FOUND. (Apr. 16, 2012),
https://www.eff.org/deeplinks/2012/04/will-industry-agree-meaningful-do-not-track

Nov. 2012]

MISSED OPPORTUNITY

375

ternet Explorer, IE10, will have “do not track” as its default browser
234
This
setting, requiring users to affirmatively opt-in to tracking.
seems to fly in the face of the Association of National Advertisers ar235
gument that such a move will destroy businesses.
C. Future
These initiatives, both domestic and international, provide support for legislation requiring an “opt-in” to information sharing
based on a conceptualization of ownership of digital information.
Such legislation must have certain characteristics. It must address
functionality, not technology. Here the functionality is commercial
grooming to eradicate the reasonable expectation of privacy by obtaining information and displaying it. It must have a meaningful optin provision that is not tied to the terms of service. Finally, it must incorporate concepts of data ownership by the individual.
In the satellite imaging technology scenario, this could similarly
be accomplished. The individual would by default be assumed not to
disclose property to the entities that image and publish it. The automatic setting is to minimum disclosure. If this information is collected, the individual owns the image of his private property and has
the right to preclude its publication.
This legislation, combined with current Fourth Amendment jurisprudence, would restore the necessary privacy protections. It would
not only protect privacy, but it would do so by providing the mechanism by which one can demonstrate one’s expectation of privacy.
Thus, application of the Katz test would be appropriate because a
court would have some way of determining if a person demonstrated
his expectation by selecting not to opt in to disclosure.
Interestingly, Justice Scalia’s trespass-based solution may then
prove viable, if combined with the concept of ownership of data. If the
law were to recognize that individuals own their digital footprints,
then when the government obtains this data in collecting information, it has “engag[ed] in physical intrusion of a constitutionally
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2012),
http://money.cnn.com/2012/06/01/technology/Internet-explorer-do-nottrack/index.htm (reporting on Microsoft’s decision to implement “Do Not Track” as a
default in the new version of Internet Explorer).
Id. (reporting on the argument of the Association of National Advertisers that Microsoft’s
plan is “irresponsible”).
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protected area in order to obtain information . . . .”
As such, a
search has occurred under Jones. Such a marrying of concepts—
ownership of digital information and a trespass-based analysis—may
then provide additional protection. The landscape would be as follows: an individual owns her digital footprint when it is information
about herself or about papers, houses, or effects which she has
demonstrated a desire to keep private by not actively disclosing that
information. A company may not condition her expectation of privacy. Rather, information will be private if she has not opted for its disclosure. Should the government use technology to gain that information, it has conducted a search.
CONCLUSION
The contemporary problem is that individuals no longer possess
true subjective expectations of privacy due to an awareness of the
possibility that information about them will be gathered through
publicly available technologies. The consequences of this must be altered. Under today’s regime, the consequences include a lack of
Fourth Amendment protection. Such should not be the case, particularly when that lack of expectation is due to commercial conditioning. Instead, our legislative response should adopt a data ownership
model for data exposed either through no action of the individual or
collaterally to a transaction. This model should require an opt-in approach for information sharing and an ability to retrieve published
information when desired. This ownership model works with our
fundamental Fourth Amendment understandings. Thus, the individual has an option to demonstrate her privacy expectations and
trigger Fourth Amendment protection.
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United States v. Jones, 132 S. Ct. 945, 951 (2012) (quoting United States v. Knotts, 460
U.S. 276, 286 (1983) (Brennan, J., concurring)).

